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1 Introduction
Women’s place in politics is a long debated subject. Many countries did not admit
women the right to vote before long after most men had received this right. And even
long after they were granted suffrage, women remain under-represented in electoral
politics.
In Norway, five of the seven biggest political parties have imposed quota rules to
achieve a certain share of women on election lists. One justification of this is that men
are favored in the nomination process, and that this needs to be corrected for to ensure
equal opportunities. Based on ideas of social justice, quotation is then necessary to
ensure equal rights of participation. However, other reasons are often stated, mainly
that more equal representation also makes the views of the democratic institution in
question more representative.
In this thesis I will not discuss which one of these reasons is the ’best’, or whether
any of them are good at all.2 However, both from a political and an economic-theoretic
point of view, it is of high interest to investigate the empirical validity of the second:
Does increasing representation of women in politics really lead to policy outcomes
which are more favoured among women? If this is the case, that the degree to which
a the demands of a group are met by democratic institutions depends on its direct
representation in these institutions, this certainly says something about how (or how
well) the democracy is working. Secondly, it will help us answering a central question
in political economics: Do politicians act according to their personal preferences when
deciding on policies?
The literature is divided on this, but an increasing number of empirical studies have
presented evidence indicating that personal preferences do matter. In chapter 2, I will
give a brief review on some of the theoretical discussion concerning this question and a
more detailed survey on empirical literature. To motivate the empirical analysis I also
present formally a citizen-candidate type of model where the differences between men
and women are given an explicit role. The model is based by the one by Besley and
Coate (1997) but with the distinctive feature that access to political positions differs
between women and men. I show that changes in this imbalance can result in changing
2For a critique of the latter type of reasoning, see e.g. Skjeie and Teigen (2003), chapter 10.
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political priorities.
In the same chapter I go through some of the quite recent literature in economics
on the role of women in politics, some of which does not focus directly on women
as politicians but which I nevertheless regard as a helpful basis for my study. The
examples of other studies illustrate that women in politics has been a highly popular
subject of study in political economics during recent years.
I then examine the question empirically myself, testing whether there is an effect
of female representation in Norwegian local politics on the composition of local public
spending. For this I use spending data for all Norwegian municipalities during the
period 1972-1999. This data is highly suitable for several reasons: (1) Norwegian
municipalities operate within the same institutional environment. (2) It covers a period
of time with large variation in the key explanatory variable, namely the shares of women
in the local councils. And (3), this variation can be argued to be driven by exogenous
factors, making it possible to separate this variable’s effect on the political outcome.
Section 3 describes the institutional features of Norwegian local politics and the data
set.
Chapter 4 contains the main empirical analysis of my thesis. Regressions are carried
out using a fixed effects (FE) model. This implies that all statistical inference comes
from variation over time within each municipality. I employ a rich set of political,
demographical and socio-economic control variables. In most specifications I estimate
effects on different budget shares (eight in total), but I also include a slightly different
specification for the prioritization between spending on childcare, education and elderly
care. This is done in order to compare my results with those of Svaleryd (2009), who
has done a similar study of Swedish local politics.
I find a modest but highly significant positive effect of the share of women in the
council on the budget share devoted to childcare. This estimate is highly robust to
inclusion of control variables. I also find a positive effect on the spending on church and
cultural services and a negative effect for spending on central administration, though
these have lower levels of significance and are sensitive to the choice of time period.
In chapter 5 I discuss the results, pointing at potential problems of omitted variables
and endogeneity in the regressors. I argue that the fact that the estimated effects are
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so stable across specifications with different controls could indicate that these problems
are not of major concern, but emphasize that I do not have proof on this.
In an attempt to overcome this uncertainty, I examine in chapter 6 whether the
share of women in the council could be instrumented using the introduction of party-
specific rules for gender quotation in candidate nomination processes. Using time-
invariant proxies for party strength and female under-representation, I find that the
introduction of such rules in the Labour Party in 1983 had a significant effect on the
female share in local councils in municipalities where the Labour Party had a strong
position and where this share previously had been low. I do not find similar effects for
the other parties which have introduced quota rules.
This chapter also contains the results of a two-stage least squares regression when
the instrument which is shown to be significant is used. The estimated effects of women
in the council on public spending from this regressions are however too imprecise to
say anything about the validity of the results of section 4. This is probably because
the instrument gives us too little variation.
Chapter 6 sums up and concludes.
2 The role of politicians
One baseline model in political economy and political science is the median voter model
(Downs, 1957). This theory postulates that in a representative democracy with two
candidates, both candidates’ platforms will converge to the policy preferred by the
median voter. This again determines the policy outcome. Neither party affiliation nor
personal characteristics (the two of which are essentially equivalent in this setting) of
the candidates will hence matter for policy, and who wins the election is uninteresting.
This result has been challenged both theoretically and empirically, especially in
recent studies. To a non-theorist, it might seem odd why it should be difficulty to
crack a result which is so far from how we think about politics. People engage in
politics because they want to make a difference, not because they want to implement
the same policies that would have been implemented anyway. However, politicians
presumably have little joy from having a different opinion if they have no influence on
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the implemented policy. Hence it seems plausible that they do everything they can to
attract enough votes to win the election. In fact, we also see this in election campaigns
in real life: Candidates try to please all the voters, and we seldom have an ’extreme’
election winner.
However, the complete convergence postulated by the median voter model has been
shown not to be the only possible outcome if central assumptions are changed. The
Downsian result relies on the assumption that politicians commit to their policy plat-
forms. In the citizen candidate class of models, developed by Osborne and Slivinski
(1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), the assumption is that there is no such commit-
ment. It is then a dominant strategy for an elected candidate to implement the policies
which he or she prefers. Voters take account of this and base their decisions on whom
to vote for on these observed preferences, not on policy promises.
Testing empirically whether politics result from the preferences of voters, parties or
individual politicians is not straightforward. Obviously, voters’ preferences for policy
will (at least partly) determine who they vote for. And these preferences cannot be
perfectly observed and measured. 3
Pande (2003) exploits Indian legislation for the representation of low-caste members
and tribes in state politics to investigate the effects of politicians’ identity. The Indian
system implies that legislator positions in some jurisdictions are reserved for members
of these groups, but there is still an election where all voters can vote. Pande finds
significant effects of such reservation on the implementation of policies which matter
particularly for low-caste and tribe members, something which contradicts the median
voter result saying that only voter preferences matter.
Levitt (1996) uses a simple but elegant utility-function approach to measure the
weights US senators, in their voting, put on voter preferences, the preferences of the
voters supporting them, party ideology and personal ideology, respectively. He finds
that all weights are positive, but that the latter factor is by far the most influential.4
3Gerber and Lewis (2004) criticize earlier studies rejecting the median voter theorem, arguing that
they do not include good enough measures of the median voter’s preferences.
4A relevant question is however if everything which is not included in the first three factors should be
regarded as personal ’ideology’. I suspect that it could also reflect personal self-interest or commitment
to lobby groups.
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Lee et al. (2004) also investigate voting patterns. They use a regressions-discontinuity
(RD) approach. This method utilizes that in close election, who actually gets elected
can be regarded as quasi-random. Their main result is that members of the US House
of Representatives do not change their voting as responses to exogenous changes in elec-
toral strength. This is consistent with the predictions of the no convergence-hypothesis,
and Lee et al regard it as evidence supporting the assumption that politicians cannot
credibly commit to other policies than those preferred by themselves.
A Scandinavian study finding that convergence to the median is far from perfect
is the one by Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), who studies the effect of socialist and non-
socialist rule in Swedish municipalities. Petterson-Lidbom’s also uses the RD approach.
Arguing that Swedish local politics are to a large extent bipolar, he then utilizes the
outcomes of elections where the socialist and the non-socialist party blocks received
almost half of the votes. He finds substantial effects on several economic variables of
whether the majority in the council is left- or right wing, in particular that left-wing
local regimes have higher taxes and public spending and lower unemployment rates.
Petterson-Lidbom also points out that those studies which focus on voting (e.g. Levitt
(1996) and Lee et al. (2004)) do not say much about what determines policy outcomes,
because the degree to which the votes are decisive differs a lot between vote casts.
Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) also examine party effects in local politics using the
RD design. They find that in US cities, which party holds the mayor’s position does
not matter for the size and composition of local public spending or the crime rates.
Among their possible explanations for this, one is that the populations within cities
are more homogenous than those of US states. This is consistent with the results of
Gerber and Lewis (2004), who find that politicians representing homogenous districts
are much more restricted in their choice of policies than those representing heterogenous
districts.
2.1 Women in politics
On of the most prominent examples of empirical studies finding an effect of politicians’
personal characteristics is in fact about women. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004)
utilize the Indian system of reservation of council head positions for women. The
5
system implies that one third of all such council leaders (’pradhans’) have to be women,
but it is randomly decided which districts are affected by the reservation each period.
Moreover, the female pradhan candidates still have to run for election. Duflo and
Chattopadhyay find that reservation affects policy outcomes and that these effects are
in accordance with the stated demands of women in the two states which they study
(West Bengal and Rajasthan). They also find that the effects persists when controlling
for other characteristics of the female council leaders, implying that gender seems to
be the decisive characteristic.
Rehavi (2007) uses the RD approach to investigate the effects of female state leg-
islature on public spending, utilizing that state house elections often are close races
between two candidates. She finds a positive effect on health spending and a negative
effect on the spending on corrections institutions, but no effects on other spending
purposes often associated with women. Rehavi also provides some discussion on how
one could expect the results to differ when using RD regression compared to more
traditional estimation techniques.
A study which lies close to what I do in my empirical analysis is the one by Svaleryd
(2009). She first uses survey data on politicians’ preferences to investigate the effects
of gender, and then uses Swedish municipality-level panel data to investigate the re-
lationship between women in the local council and spending on child care, education
and elderly care. She controls for demographical and socio-economic as well as other
political variables.
The effects she finds are significant and relatively large, with women spending more
on kindergartens and elderly care and less on schools. However, unlike the studies
mentioned above, Svaleryd cannot rely on any random or quasi-random variation in
the electorate. However, she argues that the fact that Swedish voters cannot vote
for candidates directly makes this a lesser concern. In addition, she comments, the
pressure to increase the number of female candidates often comes from the national
party leadership, something which I will come back to.
What is striking about Svaleryd’s study is the degree of correspondence between
the results from the examination of survey data and those from the spending data
regression. As she comments however, neither of the two include information on other
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personal characteristics of the politicians, like age or occupation, which could be impor-
tant for the results.5 Hence she argues that the reported results need not necessarily
be interpreted as the effects of gender alone but perhaps as the effects of personal
characteristics which are more common for female politicians, for instance low age and
experience.
Also Besley and Case (2003, p44) include in their study a panel-data regression
investigating showing the effect of female legislators in the upper and lower houses of
US states. Their advantage is survey data on citizens’ preferences. Controlling for
these as well as demographical and economic variables, they find that women in the
lower and upper house, at least jointly, have statistically significant positive influence
on family assistance and child support laws.
In addition to these studies, there are a number of others focusing on women in the
electorate: Edlund and Pande (2002) examine the political gender gap among voters
in the US. Today it is common knowledge that women are more likely to vote for
the Democratic Party, but this is actually a recent phenomenon. Edlund and Pande
finds that the rise of the gender gap can be attributed to the increase in divorce risk,
which causes women of lower income-groups to vote democratic because it is in their
economic interest. Lott and Kenny (1999) provide evidence that the early growth of the
US public sector can be attributed to women receiving the right to vote. They hence
argue that the gender gap is a much older phenomenon than commonly believed, but
that it could have been clouded in the 60s and 70s when men moved towards women
in political stands.
Funk and Gathmann (2008) employ micro-level data on the reported voting of
Swiss citizens. As is well-known, in Switzerland a lot of political decisions are made by
referenda, also decisions concerning public spending. Funk and Gathmann find that
women vote for more spending on environmental protection, health care and welfare
and less on agricultural subsidies and military. The estimated effects mostly also change
very little when other personal characteristics like age, marital status and employment
are controlled for.
5The survey data do include some information of this, but as Svaleryd points out it is of little value
to include it the first party of her study when it cannot be controlled for in the second.
7
When arguing for the broader relevance of their results, one of the points made by
Funk and Gathmann is that studies of electoral reservation like the one by Chattopad-
hyay and Duflo (2004) cannot fully capture the effect of female policy-makers because
reservation requirements also change the electoral environment. More specifically, it
could reduce political competition, which again potentially gives more room for the
female politicians to act according to their own partisan preferences.6
To be a bit bold, I would say that this point goes in favour of studies like mine and
Svaleryd’s, which may have other weaknesses but where gender effects are examined in
a ’natural’ political environment without gender reservation. The results of Funk and
Gathmann can only be generalized to electoral democracies if (1) female politicians
have the same preferences as women in general and (2) they enjoy room to pursue
their own interests once elected. (2) is the main subject of this thesis. Concerning (1),
A˚gren et al. (2007) find that the preferences of voters and female politicians differ, also
when they are of the same sex.7 This does however not mean that female politicians
cannot still be more similar to female voters in their preferences than male politicians
are.
All these studies add proof to the rather generally accepted view that the political
preferences of men and women differ. In what directions men and women differ is
however expected to largely depend on characteristics of the political system of study.
According to Dufly and Chattopadhyar, pure drinking water is an essential political
demand for women in India. In Scandinavia on the other hand, child care coverage is
a more natural choice of dependent variable.
2.2 Theoretical framework
Among the empirical studies mentioned above, several refer rather directly to the
’citizen-candidate’ model, claiming that their results provide support for this class of
6Indeed, Svaleryd (2009) finds some evidence that female politicians have less of an impact on
policy outcomes when political competition is strong. Her interpretation of this is that low political
competition enables politicians (most of them being men) to further their own interests instead of
those of the electorate (of which women make up about one half).
7More specifically, they find that there is a significant effect of being a politician on preferences,
also when controlling for gender as well as other personal characteristics.
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models. The popularity of the citizen-candidate model in this setting is due both to the
fact that it allows for policy divergence and that it offers an explicit role for individual
preferences in determining this divergence. To get some intuition for why the role of
women in politics might matter, I here present a slightly altered version of the model.
Both the model here and the discussion of its equilibria is based on the one-
dimensional example given by (Besley and Coate, 1997, p98). It differs from their
model in that it divides the citizens into two groups, men and women, based on the
assumption that these groups differ in both their preferences and their ability to engage
in politics. It is hence similar to the one by Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), but while
they take these participation opportunities as given and discuss the effect of reserving
the political position for women, I show what happens if there is a structural change
in these gender differences in candidate recruitment.8
For simplicity, I assume that the policy space is one-dimensional and voter pref-
erences are euclidian (Besley and Coate, 1997, p98). The set of possible policies is
then [0, 1]. On this interval, each man i and each woman j has an ideal point ωi or
ωj. I further assume that the population is finite and odd-numbered and that men are
located on [0,m− ²) and women on [m− ², 1], where m denotes the preferred policy of
the median voter (who could be either a man or a woman) and ² is a small positive or
negative number. This implies that the two groups are of about the same size and that
their preferences do not overlap. (The latter is of course a dramatic simplification.)
Following Besley and Case I also assume that voters vote strategically.9
Central in citizen-candidate models is that the set of candidates is endogenous. Let
ℵ be the set containing all citizens. Any citizen i, j ∈ ℵ will choose to run for election
if the benefit exceeds the cost, denoted as δ. The setting is as follows (Persson and
Tabellini, 2000): First citizens decide on whether to enter the election or not. Then
the election is held. If several candidates receive the same number of votes (and no
one else receives more), we assume that they can all win with equal probability (e.g.
8In addition, Chattopadhyay and Duflo assume that the policy implemented is partly determined
by the power of the ’local elite’ no matter who wins the election, something which I regard as being
of lesser relevance for my discussion.
9This basically means that they do not necessarily vote for the candidate whose preferences are
closest to their own, but consider also who has the chance of winning.
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1/2). Third, the candidate chooses which policy x ∈ [0, 1] to implement.
Without a commitment device, it is a dominant strategy for each candidate to
implements the policy he or she prefers the most if elected. Any other strategy would
be based on a non-credible promise and could hence not be part of a subgame perfect
equilibrium. If no candidate runs for election, the default policy 0 is implemented.
(Unless campaign costs are very high, this will not happen.) Hence the utility from
winning is equal to ωi − δ if a man wins and ωj − δ if a woman does.
Let us now assume that the costs of running for election differ for women and men
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004). This could for instance be due to the party systems
favouring male candidates or economic or social obstacles in the society facing women
who want to engage in politics. I assume δI < δJ , where I denotes male and J denotes
female candidates. There are no differences in the campaign costs among women or
among men. Additionaly, I assume δI ≥ 2².
Several equilibria are possible in this model. Firstly, there exists an equilibrium
where only the male candidate i runs for election if and only if
(1M) ωi ≥ δI
(2M) there exists no other male candidate k such that ωi + δI < ωk
(3M) there exists no female candidate l such that ωi + δJ < ωl < 2m− ωi
Similarly, there exists a single-candidate equilibrium with a female candidate j if
and only if
(1W) ωj ≥ δJ
(2W) there exists no other female candidate l such that l < ωj − δJ
(3W) there exists no male candidate k such that 2m− ωj < ωk < ωj − δI10
These conditions are in principle the same as those stated by Besley and Coate
(1997, p98). Conditions (1M) and (1W) simply mean that the candidate must find
it worthwhile to run for election given that no one else does (considering the default
policy as the alternative). (2M) and (2W) state the requirement that the candidate is
10Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) show the conditions for never having a female candidate, but I
find this to be of lesser relevance here.
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not so far away from the median that there exists a more moderate candidate of the
same sex who is both willing to run and will win if he or she does. Conditions (3M)
and (3W) require that the same is also true for a competitor of the opposite sex.
However, since δM < δW , these conditions are not the same for women and men.
Exactly how strict they are depend on the actual set of possible candidates, which
is finite. However, (3M) is ’less likely’ to be violated than (3W) because the higher
campaign costs imply that a challenger of the opposite sex is less likely to exist. At
the same time, (2W) is less restrictive than (3W), reflecting that a female candidate is
also less likely to be challenged by a more moderate candidate of the same sex. This
has some intuitive appeal. 11
A two-candidate equilibrium exists if and only if (I) (ωi+ωj)/2 = m, that is if a male
and female candidate are equally preferred by the median voter, and (II) |ωi−ωj|/2 ≥
δW . The second condition says that the female candidate must find it worthwhile to run
for election given she only has 1/2 probability of winning.12 (This is trivially satisfied
for the male candidate since his cost of running is smaller.) This also makes intuitive
sense: If the cost of running for election is high, only women who disagree relatively
much with their male combatant will decide to run against him. With strategic voting
and mild assumptions on the distribution of citizens’ preferences, Besley and Coate
(1997) show that there are no equilibria with more than two candidates.
How can this help when discussing the effects of women’s involvement in politics? Say
that there is a decrease in δW due to for instance political parties actively promoting
female candidates, while at the same time everything else is left unchanged. This will
make condition (3M) stricter, implying that some single-candidate equilibria with very
’pro-male’ candidates are no longer equilibria.
Secondly, (2W) will be stricter because a relatively ’pro-women’ female candidate is
11If we had however assumed that the population was infinite and continuous in their set of pref-
erences, we see that (2W) is trivially satisfied if (3W) is. The other conditions become (2M*)
ωi > m − ² − δM , (3M*) ωi > m − 12δW and (3W*) ωj < m + 12δM . In this case we see that
(3W*) explicitly requires female candidates in a single-candidate election to lie closer to the median
than does (3M*). (2M*) is also stricter than (3W*) except for in the special case where ² = δI .
12Due to the assumption on the small magnitude of ², there is no equilibria with two candidates of
the same sex.
11
more likely to be challenged by a more moderate woman. For this to matter however,
the female candidate must be relatively far from the median and it must be the case
that there are no male candidates in the moderate subset of [0,m − ²] who would
otherwise breach condition (3W). 13
Thirdly, the set of possible two-candidate equilibria will be larger because the re-
quired political distance between the male and the female candidate is smaller.
Because of the multiple equilibria feature the model does not give a clear answer
to whether lowered campaign costs δW lead to more women in politics
14, although it
shows how this could be the effect. And if it does, the model is also not perfectly clear
on whether this leads to more women-favoured policy outcomes. (Recall condition
[2W].) This ambiguity can be considered a strength of the model, because it opens up
for a different role of ’moderate’ women entering politics. The model also shows how
improved conditions for female involvement in politics may force male candidates to
moderate themselves.
What is clear however is that if there is a structural change leading to more women
being elected as politicians and these women differ from their male colleagues in some
preference dimension, this will unambiguously affect the policy outcome. This is be-
cause the elected candidate always implements his or her preferred policy. This effect
occurs even though voter preferences have not changed. The citizen candidate model
hence predicts that there could be an independent effect of legislator identity, which
the median voter model does not.
At the same time, voters preferences still have an important role, because a candi-
date can only win if she is either close enough to the median voter to run uncontested
or equally preferred by the median voter as another candidate. (And in the latter
case, each candidate is expected to win half of the elections.) If the voters preferences
change in a ’female’ direction (here modeled as an increase in ², meaning that the
actual female share of the population increases), this will lead both to more women
being elected and more women-preferred policy outcomes. The model hence underlines
the importance of separating between the effects of voter’s preferences and of those of
13With a continuous set of preferences, there would hence be no effect of a change in δW on these
equilibria.
14unless of course, if the cost initially is so high that it is prohibitive
12
politicians themselves.
It is important to note that the implications of the citizen candidate model is not that
there is always policy divergence away from the median voter’s preferences. Besley and
Coate (1997) show that if there exists a voter for which m is the ideal point and δ is
sufficiently small, the only single-candidate equilibrium possible is the one where the
median voter herself is elected. For small δ the distance between the competitors in a
two-candidate equilibrium can also be very small.
Stylized as it is, when thinking about an American presidential election or a Congress
election in a single-candidate district, this model actually provides intuition which can
explain real-life phenomena.15 But how relevant is it for explaining the policy outcomes
of an electoral democracy like the one in Norwegian municipalities?
The model has significant drawbacks in this manner. The standard model assumes
that voters vote directly for candidates and leaves no role for parties. Cadigan and
Janeba (2002) have developed a model which also takes into account the role of party
primary elections. However, also in their model voters in the general election vote
directly for candidates, and not parties represented by several candidates. Moreover,
party members voting in the primary also vote for only one candidate. If we move
away from elections where the candidate who gets the most votes wins the whole
district to elections where multiple candidates are to be elected from each district (as
in Scandinavian local elections), the link between the model and the object of study
becomes less clear.16 Nevertheless, Besley (2005) argues that these models also are
relevant when studying party politics since the identity of for instance party leaders
can matter a lot for elections.
What I find appealing about the theoretical approach modeled here is that it un-
derlines that it is not only the distribution of voter preferences but also the rules of the
game - how candidates are recruited - that matter for who is elected and what policies
are implemented. In fact, modeling this as changing costs of running for election for
female and male candidates is a useful way to think about the changes which have
15Osborne and Slivinski (1996) also include a in their study results for a system with a second election
if no candidate gets a majority in the first round, analogous to the French presidential election system.
16Neither Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) nor Svaleryd (2009) refer to the citizen-candidate model or any
other theoretical model in a mathematic form.
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occurred as women have fought themselves into politics during the last decades, three
of which I will now study more closely.
3 Data
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(The average shares are calculated for the municipalities which existed at the beginning of each
election period. Note that the female share is an unweighted mean of the the shares in all
municipalities, not the fraction women among all local council representatives in Norway.)
To investigate the link between women in politics and public spending I utilize
municipal accounting data and political, demographical and socio-economic variables
from from the Norwegian Social Science Data Service (NSD). The data covers the period
1972-1999, a period where female representation in politics rose rapidly, as shown on
figure 1. If this increase reflect changes in the barriers facing women in the electoral
systems, which is likely, it should hence be suitable for studying the effects in which I
are interested.
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As of today, Norway has 430 municipalities. Their population sizes range from 228
(Utsira) to about half a million (Oslo). The local governments constitute a central part
of the Norwegian welfare state and of the economy in general. In 2007, 19.4 percent of
all of those working in Norway (excluding the offshore economy) were employed by the
municipal sector and local public consumption amounted to 9.5 percent of Norway’s
gross domestic product (SSB, 2008).
One big advantage of the data set is the large number of observations. It covers
429 to 453 municipalities17 over a time span of 28 years. Another advantage is that
the institutional framework is to a large extent the same, both across municipalities
and over time. (This is in contrast to for instance cross-country data.) At the same
time, each local government enjoys considerable discretion in choosing the composition
of spending.
3.1 Institutional characteristics
Each municipality in Norway is governed by a local council, which is elected by the
citizens every forth year. The election system is proportional, meaning that seats are
assigned to each party or election list based on the share of votes they receive in the
municipality as a whole.
The council is led by the mayor, who is elected at the beginning of each election
period. Except for in those few municipalities which have recently adapted the par-
liamentary model (and which are not included in my data), there is no political body
representing the ruling party or coalition. Instead, there is an executive committee
(’formannskapet’), where all parties are often represented.
Martinussen (2004) argues that prior to the local government reform in 1992, Nor-
wegian local politics were to a large extent consensus-based. Before the reform, a
qualified majority was required for most decisions. A ruling coalition (if one could call
it that at all) either had to represent a large fraction of voters or reach agreements
with some of the other parties when deciding on policies. This implies that represen-
tatives not belonging to the ruling party or coalition have some influence on the policy
17Oslo municipality is excluded for the four last election periods, because it adopted the parliamen-
tary system in 1986.
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decisions. The local administration also plays an important role, preparing the budget
and giving its recommendations on various issues.
The local council votes over the municipality budget for each year. Among the
spending purposes are education, elderly care, health and social services, kindergartens,
housing and infrastructure. The municipalities are relatively free to prioritize between
these. Considering childcare, Kro¨ger (1997) argues that Norwegian municipalities have
enjoyed much more discretion in determining the level of services to offer than their
Swedish counterparts. At the same time, the size of the total budget is largely de-
termined by grants from the central government. As apposed to those in Sweden,
Norwegian municipalities are required to have a nonnegative net operating surplus
(Borge, 2005, Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008). Moreover, they cannot freely choose the level
of taxes, or at least they seldom do so, property taxes being an exception (Fiva and
Rattsø, 2007).
3.2 Data set
The dependent variables employed are total spending in each sector as shares of total
spending on all sectors. Total spending consist of current expenditures as well as invest-
ment and spending on maintenance. Figure 2 shows how these shares have changed
over time for the eight sectors employed in my analysis. Table 9 in the appendix
contains summary statistics.
The sectors are childcare, elderly care, education, health and social services, cultural
services, transport and infrastructure18, central administration and ”other purposes”.
The latter is on average the largest and includes among other things housing services,
which was found to be difficult to construct as a separate category. ’Elderly care’ does
to some extent also include care for the disabled, at least for the years following 1991.
In official statistics, the division into main categories used for the accounting data
have changed somewhat over time, especially between 1990 and 1991. High effort has
been made in reorganizing the data in order to make the main spending categories
more consistent over time than they are in the official statistics. The jump in elderly
18Note that this includes both spending on roads and public transport, which might be favoured
very differently by different politicians.
16






















1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996
Year
Childcare Education Elderly care
Health & social Church & culture Transport
Central adm. Other purposes
(The shares given here are the averages among the municipalities which existed each year. Note
that they are unweighted means of the the shares in all municipalities, not shares of total municipal
spending in Norway as a whole.)
care spending and the fall in spending on health care and social services seen on figure
2 partly reflects that this consistency is not perfect, but the former could also partly be
explained by a government reform of care for the disabled (”HVPU-reformen”) which
was implemented at that time.
The data on female politicians and party representation is described on table 10 in
the appendix. This includes the number of female representatives in the local coun-
cil, but unfortunately no other personal characteristics like the age or occupation the
representatives. This is a drawback, since gender is likely to be correlated with for
instance age or experience.19
19For the 2005 and 2007 elections, more data on this is available. In both these elections, the shares
of elected representatives aged less than 30 years, 30-39 years and 40-49 years were all higher among
female representatives than among representatives overall.
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I also include other variables related to the electoral outcome. The electoral data
gives information on the number of votes and representatives for each party and on
which party holds the positions of mayor and deputy mayor, but not on which parties
actually form the ruling coalition. However, even if we had this information, it would
not give the whole picture because the degree to which these parties operate alone or
with support from the rest is likely to vary a lot.
The political parties and election lists are classified as either left-wing, right-wing
or unclassified, the latter mainly consisting of local or ’non-political’ election lists. The
center parties are included in the right-wing block. According to Strøm and Leipart
(1993) the left-right cleavage is the main division in Norwegian party politics. Several
studies, e.g. (Fiva and Rattsø, 2007), find that the share of left-wing representation is
correlated with policy outcomes.
Demographical data (total population, fractions for each age group and fraction
women in the population) is also included for each year. In addition, I employ other
socio-economic variables. Mean income is constructed from the tax statistics and is
available for the period 1979-1999. Another more gender-specific variable is female
labour participation, which is unfortunately only available for the period 1986-1999.
The shares of adult women who are divorced and unmarried are available for all years
except 1972, and and the share of the population with higher education is available
for 1985-1999). Descriptive statistics for these variables are given on table 11 in the
appendix.
4 Estimation
In section 2.2, I showed how external conditions leading to more female politicians
could affect the policy outcome. I will now empirically examine whether this is the
case. For this I use the data described above and estimate the effects of the share
of women in the local council on the relative sizes of eight categories of local public
spending.
Due to the aforementioned relative low discretion Norwegian municipalities enjoy
in deciding on the budget size, I will focus on the composition rather than the size
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of total spending. One nice feature with using budget shares as dependent variables
is that when we study each regressors’s influence on all spending shares, these effects
sum to zero.
Previous studies give only weak predictions of what the estimated effects will be
in this one. Svaleryd uses spending in each sector relative to each of the two others
and not as share of the total budget. Her regression results both from the survey and
spending data indicate that female politicians prioritize both childcare and education
over elderly care, with no significant ranking of the former two. Using my specification,
this is likely to imply a negative effect on the budget share spent on elderly care20, while
the effects on spending for the two other purposes could potentially be of both signs.
The results of Rehavi (2007) associate female politicians with health care services .
4.1 Empirical strategy




= γis + ξit + βiwomansharest + λicontrolsst + ²ist (1)
where i denotes the purpose of spending, s denotes municipality and t denotes time.
Womansharest is the share of women in the local council and βi is its effect on spending
in sector i. λi is a vector of coefficients and controlsst is a vector of control variables.
²ist is the error term. The assumptions made about the latter is that




itu for s = r,
0 otherwise
The first is the standard OLS assumption, implying that the error terms are un-
correlated with the regressors. The second states that the error terms are allowed
20This does however not necessarily need to be the case. It could be that female politicians put
even lower priority on the other five spending purposes.
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to be correlated within but not across municipalities. Allowing for arbitrary within-
correlation in fixed effects regression is advocated by Wooldridge (2003).21
γis represents the municipality fixed effect in state s. Fixed effects are used because
municipalities are likely to have some local characteristics which are hard to observe
and hence control for. In addition, I control for time fixed effects ξit. These are likely
to be important because there have been some government reforms during the period
which have led to higher spending in some sectors and lower spending in others, recall
figure 2.
The fixed effects allow each municipality to have a different intercept term, which
also varies depending on the year we are in. (However, the year effect’s contribution to
the intercept is the same for all municipalities.) The slopes are assumed to be the same.
The advantage of this is that there is less concern about omitted variables. However, by
assigning so much of the variation to the fixed effects, one also has left less variation in
the data. The FE estimator is also called the ’within’ estimator because it only utilizes
variation within each municipality. All variation across municipalities (cross-sectional)
is assigned to the municipality-specific dummies.
Control variables are added in order to control for factors which could be related to
both spending and the number of women in the council. If these are important, omitting
them would lead to the βi’s picking up other effects that those in which I am interested.
In the framework of section 2.2, this mainly concerns voter preferences. However, I also
take into account that the electoral outcome could matter in itself (Pettersson-Lidbom,
2008) and also control for the political colour of the current regime. The point is to
examine whether female representatives enjoy sufficient discretion to pursue their own
interests beyond the impact of other policy-determining factors.




= γis + ξit + βiwomansharest + ²ist (2)
A specification without fixed effects would not be very informative, since the share of
21This is handled by the regression option cluster in Stata.
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women has increased over time in almost all municipality councils since 197222 while
the composition of local public spending has changed a lot during the same period.
Next I add variables controlling for the colour of the political regime. Whether this
is innocent or not is not quite clear, and is discussed in section 5. However, leaving
these variables out would be problematic. According to the discussion in section 2.2,
it does not only matter how many women are elected but also which men are. For
instance, left-wing parties are known to favour kindergarten spending more than right-
wing parties (Sørensen, 1995, Svaleryd, 2009). If they are also more likely to have
female representatives, the coefficient βChildcare could be picking up what is truly an
effect of party, not of gender.23 Furthermore, Svaleryd (2009) argues that the share of
socialist votes is also likely to reflect some of the voters’ preferences for spending.
The first political control variable is hence the left-wing share of votes. This might
not say everything, but I am not interested in the effects of parties as such. What I
want is to isolate the effect of women in the council. The other is the degree of party
fragmentation in the local council. This is measured by the Herfindahl index, which is
calculated by the sum of the squared shares of seats each party holds in the council (see
Fiva and Rattsø, 2007). This could potentially be of importance, if for instance the
fact that each party holds few seats makes it harder for women to get elected. (Since
men often are top candidates on the party lists.)
In the ’standard specification’ of this section I also control for demographical vari-
ables. For instance, we expect that when the population within a municipality grows
older, the preferences of voters will put more weight on elderly care and less on kinder-
gartens.24 If the likeliness of electing more women as politicians is somehow related to
this, the estimated effects of female representation above would be biased. However,
demographical variables also have the not so attractive feature (Fiva and Natvik, 2008)
that they might to some extent be results of the political decisions, if for instance fam-
22A few had high shares already in 1971 due to female activists encouraging voters to give female
politicians ’extra votes’. This caused female majorities is Oslo, Trondheim and Asker municipalities.
23In 1975, women made up 16.2 percent of all elected left-wing representatives and 15.3 percent of
all all elected right-wing representatives. In the 1995 election, the shares were 37.6 and 30.4 percent,
respectively.
24If the politicians to some extent behave as good social planners it should effect their priorities as
well, regardless of electoral incentives.
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ilies with children move to municipalities with high kindergarten coverage. This may
cause simultaneity bias in all coefficients. However, we cannot know in advance if this
problem is more or less severe than the omitted variable problem occuring if they are
not included.
In yet another specification I introduce some additional control variables. Some of
these are potentially important, but they are unfortunately not available for the whole
time period.
Newly elected representatives (Newreps) measures the share of the local council
made up by representatives who were not members of the council in the previous
election period. This variable is included because as mentioned, gender is likely to be
related to other characteristics like for instance age and experience. Since I do not have
data on these characteristics, the share of newly elected representatives is regarded a
second-best solution since it is likely to be correlated with one or both of them. Of
course the estimated coefficient for this variable mat also pick up some effects related
to a less stable political climate and of parties themselves changing candidates more
often.
Edlund and Pande (2002) argue that women’s higher preference for government
spending in the US is a result of increased divorce risk, making it in the interest of
women to have a large public sector. How this would effect the composition of public
spending considered here is not clear, but it could for instance lead to women who
previously were housewives starting to do paid work and hence higher demand for
public childcare. To make interpretation of the coefficient easier I use divorced women
as share of the sum of married and divorced women. Because inhabitants move (and
some die) this is of course not the same as the share of marriages which end in divorce,
but it is a proxy for the risk of divorce for those married.
The share of single parents would also have been a natural control variable, espe-
cially for effects on kindergarten spending, but the data on this is very scarce. Instead
I include the share of adult women who are unmarried, since this is likely be corre-
lated with the occurrence of single parenthood.25 Moreover, nonmarriage or postponed
25Recall that the data goes back some years, so parents living together without being married was
not as common as it it today.
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marriage is likely to be correlated with liberal attitudes which could imply voting for
female politicians.
Furthermore, I control for mean income and the female labour participation rate.
The former is quite standard in political economics (see Besley and Case, 2003), while
the latter is likely to affect the demand for public child care and possibly also women’s
participation in politics. Including it is however not totally unproblematic since the
causality could also go the other way: higher female labour supply due to better
kindergarten coverage.
Finally I include the share of population with higher education, which Svaleryd
argues to be relevant. A priori, this could also be expected to affect female participation
in politics and certain types of spending. The drawback with the extra variables is that
due to their lesser availability in earlier periods, the number of observations drop from
12251 to 6044 if all are to be included. The appendix shows a specification where only
those variables which are available since 1980 are included.
In order to compare my results with hers, I also include a specification very similar
to the one used by Svaleryd. This is
totexpist
totexpjst
= ψsij + µtij + θijwomansharest + δijcontrolsst + ηijst (3)
where i and j denote two of the sectors child care (CC), education (ED) and elderly care
(EC) and controlsst is a vector of political, demographical and socio-economic control
variables. Two of these not employed in other specifications are the dummy variables
for left-wing and right-wing council majority, respectively. The reason why I have not
used these is that according to Martinussen (2004), simple majority should not be of
much importance prior to 1992. The control variables used in this specification are
constructed to be as similar as possible to those used by Svaleryd.26 To utilize more
observations I also include a specification like (3) with relative shares but fewer control
variables for comparison.
26One difference is that I only have data on all inhabitants with higher education, while Svaleryd
restricts her variable to those with three years or more.
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4.2 Results
Table 1 shows a highly significant positive effect of female council representation on
kindergarten spending when no control variables are included. The estimated coeffi-
cient is however only 0.007. The table shows two other significant effects, a negative
effect of -0.031 on education spending and a positive effect of 0.010 on spending on
church and cultural services. The negative effect of 0.009 on central administration
spending is also close to significant.
Table 1: Female representation and spending composition, no control variables
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
Womanshare 0.007∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.012 0.015 0.010∗∗ -0.001 -0.009 0.022
(2.22) (-2.56) (-1.05) (1.42) (2.15) (-0.26) (-1.64) (1.44)
Observations 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251
R2 0.800 0.319 0.681 0.227 0.104 0.182 0.135 0.506
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on municipalities.
Time and local government fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2: The effect of female representation on shares of total spending (1972-1999)
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
Womanshare 0.006∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.016 0.016 0.010∗∗ 0.000 -0.009 0.017
(1.90) (-2.05) (-1.35) (1.48) (2.08) (0.01) (-1.59) (1.11)
Voteshare left 0.013∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ -0.004 0.000 -0.020∗∗ 0.001 0.056∗∗
(3.39) (-4.90) (3.03) (-0.31) (0.03) (-2.10) (0.06) (2.14)
Fragmentation -0.001 0.050∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.034∗∗∗ 0.004 0.001 -0.009 0.010
(-0.26) (3.51) (-1.58) (-2.81) (0.69) (0.17) (-1.12) (0.51)
Observations 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251
R2 0.801 0.331 0.683 0.228 0.104 0.184 0.136 0.507
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on municipalities.
Time and local government fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Moving on to table 2, we see that the values of the estimated βˆi’s are very similar.
The estimated kindergarten effect is however less significant than in the previous esti-
mation, and also slightly smaller in magnitude, 0.006. When the demographical control
variables are included (table 3, it increases to 0.007 again and also gains in level of sig-
nificance. In this regression, also the estimated effect on administrative spending is
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significant. βˆculture has a slightly lower level of significance in this specification, but its
estimated magnitude is exactly the same.
Table 3: The effect of female representation on shares of total spending (1972-1999)
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
Womanshare 0.007∗∗ -0.009 -0.017 0.018 0.010∗ -0.000 -0.009∗ 0.002
(2.58) (-0.88) (-1.54) (1.58) (1.96) (-0.04) (-1.67) (0.11)
Voteshare left 0.013∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ -0.003 0.000 -0.020∗∗ 0.000 0.049∗∗
(3.49) (-5.30) (2.75) (-0.23) (0.07) (-2.18) (0.03) (2.03)
Fragmentation -0.000 0.043∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.034∗∗∗ 0.003 0.002 -0.008 0.013
(-0.01) (3.68) (-1.37) (-2.82) (0.56) (0.22) (-1.02) (0.71)
Population 0.010∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ -0.012 0.002 -0.006 0.002 -0.002 -0.127∗∗∗
(2.64) (7.88) (-1.30) (0.33) (-1.30) (0.34) (-0.51) (-7.18)
Pop. squared -0.000∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(-2.45) (-3.56) (1.61) (-0.02) (1.38) (0.04) (2.11) (3.59)
Age 0-6 0.054∗∗ 0.031 -0.062 0.059 -0.025 -0.034 0.034 -0.055
(2.12) (0.27) (-0.58) (0.55) (-0.68) (-0.64) (0.59) (-0.35)
Age 7-15 -0.078∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗ -0.113 -0.108 0.008 -0.108∗ 0.025 -0.699∗∗∗
(-2.89) (10.15) (-1.09) (-1.12) (0.14) (-1.82) (0.50) (-3.97)
Age 66+ 0.019 -0.053 0.464∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗ -0.077∗ 0.031 0.018 -0.201
(0.75) (-0.52) (4.22) (-2.32) (-1.84) (0.55) (0.44) (-1.35)
Women in pop. -0.027 -0.237 -0.302 0.013 -0.008 0.085 0.127 0.348
(-0.47) (-1.22) (-1.33) (0.08) (-0.10) (0.75) (1.33) (1.22)
Observations 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251
R2 0.803 0.406 0.688 0.231 0.106 0.187 0.137 0.528
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on municipalities.
Time and local government fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The estimated negative effect of women in the council on education spending how-
ever disappears when demographical control variables are included. The other coeffi-
cients are not very sensitive to the inclusion of controls, except for the ’other purposes’
effect, which was not significant in the first place.
Unsurprisingly, things change a bit more when the controls which do not exist for
the whole data period are included, as shown on table 4. However, while the childcare
effect now has a lower level of significance its estimated magnitude is exactly the same
as in tables 1 and 3. This is rather striking. The changes in the other coefficients
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are somewhat larger. We see that the effect on administration spending is no longer
significant, while the culture effect still is. 27
To sum up, the most robust result from the estimations is the estimated effect
of female council representation on child care expenditures. Its estimated order of
magnitude only varies between 0.007 and 0.006, and it is significantly different from
zero in all specifications.
0.007 seems little, and indeed it is a modest effect. According to this, a one standard
deviation (11 percentage points) increase in the share of women in the council gives
a 0.08 percentage point increase (0.03 standard deviations) in the share of the budget
spent on child care. However, in the average municipality spending on child care only
amounts to 3.1 percent of total spending, so the effect is not totally negligible.
Across all specifications the estimated female effect on spending on church and
cultural services is positive and significant.28 Its estimated value varies between 0.010
and 0.009. This implies that the strength of this effect is similar to that of the childcare
effect, because cultural services account for 4 percent of municipal budgets on average.
There is also some (but weaker) evidence that more women in the council leads to
slightly lower spending on central administration.
The negative effect on elderly care spending, which we a priori could expect to be
of importance, is a bit unstable across specifications and never statistically significant
at the 10 percent level. It is however ’close to’ significant when using the standard
model (table 3).
Table 5 shows the results from estimating specification 3, where the three last
columns show the model most similar to the one estimated by Svaleryd (2009). Com-
paring my results to hers, we see that the estimated effects of having more female
politicians are much smaller in my results. Take the effect on the weight put on child-
care relative to elderly care: I find this to be about 0.1129 when using the whole sample
and 0.08 (not significant) when using the richer set of control variables. She finds it
to be 0.995 and 1.012 in those specifications which technically match the most, which
27When I do not include quite as many controls and do the regression on the period 1980-1999,
table 12 in the appendix shows that it is the other way around.
28Except for in the intermediate specification shown in the appendix, where the t-value is 1.25.
29A 95 percent confidence interval is (0.006, 0.206).
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Table 4: The effect of female representation on shares of total spending (1986-1999)
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
Womanshare 0.007∗ -0.000 -0.012 0.012 0.009∗ -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
(1.92) (-0.03) (-0.78) (0.88) (1.66) (-0.99) (-0.83) (-0.31)
Newreps 0.000 0.015∗∗ -0.017 0.013 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.012
(0.03) (2.00) (-1.47) (1.18) (-0.19) (0.77) (-0.41) (-0.93)
Voteshare left 0.006 -0.015 0.027 -0.019 0.007 -0.004 0.013 -0.016
(1.00) (-0.95) (1.06) (-0.84) (0.86) (-0.41) (1.43) (-0.52)
Fragmentation 0.005 -0.001 -0.033 -0.001 0.006 0.006 -0.017 0.036
(0.73) (-0.04) (-0.99) (-0.04) (0.52) (0.45) (-1.57) (0.88)
Population -0.001 0.175∗∗∗ 0.009 0.019 0.007 0.010 0.005 -0.224∗∗∗
(-0.09) (7.01) (0.47) (0.92) (0.57) (1.33) (0.36) (-4.42)
Pop. squared 0.000 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.004∗∗∗
(0.45) (-4.96) (0.81) (-0.15) (-0.58) (-1.60) (-0.18) (2.84)
Age 0-6 0.261∗∗∗ 0.031 -0.217 0.096 -0.122 -0.028 -0.016 -0.005
(5.38) (0.18) (-1.08) (0.52) (-1.19) (-0.35) (-0.11) (-0.02)
Age 7-15 0.046 0.837∗∗∗ -0.186 0.001 -0.033 -0.248∗∗∗ 0.038 -0.455∗
(0.99) (6.66) (-0.98) (0.00) (-0.32) (-3.37) (0.39) (-1.88)
Age 66+ 0.030 0.007 0.485∗∗ -0.250∗ -0.095 0.123∗ 0.129∗ -0.429∗∗
(0.81) (0.06) (2.53) (-1.72) (-1.41) (1.68) (1.92) (-2.01)
Women in pop. -0.039 -0.262 -0.203 0.211 -0.023 0.007 -0.046 0.355
(-0.54) (-1.20) (-0.70) (0.89) (-0.16) (0.06) (-0.33) (0.75)
Mean income -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.39) (-0.29) (1.10) (0.05) (0.34) (1.45) (-1.31) (-0.53)
Divorce risk -0.012 0.106 0.313∗∗ -0.020 -0.044 0.045 -0.091 -0.297
(-0.36) (1.13) (2.24) (-0.16) (-0.74) (0.87) (-1.55) (-1.65)
Unmarried wom. 0.054∗∗ 0.070 -0.250∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.037 -0.083∗∗ 0.024 -0.062
(2.02) (0.87) (-2.13) (2.01) (0.81) (-2.07) (0.44) (-0.43)
Women working 0.040∗∗∗ -0.042 -0.089∗∗ -0.072∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.062∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(3.54) (-1.29) (-2.06) (-2.07) (2.73) (0.07) (-2.99) (3.36)
Higher ed. 0.093∗ 0.046 -0.037 0.018 0.046 0.030 0.123 -0.319
(1.83) (0.25) (-0.17) (0.10) (0.49) (0.36) (0.94) (-0.83)
Observations 6044 6044 6044 6044 6044 6044 6044 6044
R2 0.588 0.232 0.571 0.274 0.041 0.115 0.023 0.483
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on municipalities.
Time and local government fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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is about ten times as big of an effect. This could reflect the fact that Swedish local
authorities in general enjoy more discretion in determining the level of spending. When
the budget does not need to balance, it is easier to raise more money for those purposes
the council finds important. It could however also reflect differences in the system of
local governance, for instance that the voice of the women in the council is less heard
in a consensus-based democracy like the Norwegian.
Also the other estimated effects are smaller in magnitude in my results. Compar-
ing these make however less sense because those which are statistically significant in
Svaleryd’s result are not in mine, and vice versa. I find no evidence at all that female
politicians prioritize education over elderly care, which her results clearly indicate. On
the other hand, I find a weakly significant effect on the weight put on childcare over
education, which she does not. According to Kro¨ger (1997), day care services in Swe-
den are to a larger extent than in Norway regulated by the state, while the coverage
was also broader at an earlier stage. This might imply that Norwegian female local
politicians had to fight harder for better child care, also at the expense of spending
education. However, other institutional differences could also be of importance.
Moving on to the political control variables, we see that the share of votes cast for
the left-wing block shows positive effects on the spending on childcare and elderly care
and a negative effect on education spending in both tables 2 and 3. These three ef-
fects are roughly in line with what is predicted by the survey data study by Sørensen
(1995) and the survey and spending data study by Svaleryd (2009).30 Fiva and Natvik
(2008) finds that when the left-wing has the mayor and experiences a positive shock
in the re-election probability, investment in childcare increases. Sørensen (1995) also
finds that Labour Party politicians have higher demand for spending on construction,
something which could explain the estimated positive effect for the ’other’-sector in my
results. Concerning the negative effect on spending on transport and infrastructure,
the literature to my knowledge says little about whether this is as expected.
Looking at table 3 and the last three columns of 5, my estimated left-wing effect
seems to go more in the direction of favouring elderly care on the cost of education,
30Only the latter study considers elderly care a separate sector (from health care and social services
in general).
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Table 5: The effect of female representation on relative priorities
CC/EC CC/ED ED/EC CC/EC CC/ED ED/EC
Womanshare 0.106∗∗ 0.025∗ 1.124 0.080 0.037∗ -0.092
(2.08) (1.78) (0.57) (1.33) (1.82) (-0.26)
Voteshare left -0.009 0.023 -16.152∗∗∗ -0.137 0.050 -0.947∗∗
(-0.08) (1.08) (-3.51) (-1.51) (1.44) (-2.10)
Leftwing maj. 0.007 -0.001 0.452 0.003 -0.003 0.000
(0.34) (-0.11) (0.42) (0.13) (-0.42) (0.00)
Rightwing maj. -0.003 -0.008∗ 0.133 0.003 -0.015∗ 0.072
(-0.22) (-1.69) (0.21) (0.13) (-1.69) (0.49)
Age 0-6 0.878 0.678∗∗∗ 75.196∗ -0.122 1.564∗∗∗
(1.07) (4.39) (1.96) (-0.15) (5.12)
Age 7-15 0.231 -0.525∗∗∗ 108.475∗∗∗ -0.566∗∗ 9.901∗∗
(0.47) (-3.37) (4.74) (-2.47) (2.34)
Age 66+ -1.395∗∗∗ 0.186 6.284 -3.211∗∗∗ -12.889∗∗∗
(-3.02) (1.24) (0.28) (-4.94) (-3.73)
Women working 0.844∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 1.546∗
(5.18) (3.57) (1.83)
Mean income -0.493∗∗∗ -0.047 -1.827∗∗∗
(-3.19) (-0.97) (-2.77)
Women in pop. 1.072 -0.266 -86.985 1.039 -0.472 1.494
(1.53) (-1.05) (-1.47) (0.95) (-1.08) (0.24)
Population 0.005 -0.093∗∗∗ 14.890∗∗∗ -0.646∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -3.182∗∗∗
(0.06) (-4.02) (3.10) (-3.73) (-5.25) (-3.30)
Higher ed. -1.053 0.348 -1.780
(-1.22) (1.27) (-0.34)
Observations 12294 12312 12300 6073 6077 6079
R2 0.173 0.768 0.075 0.166 0.491 0.416
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on municipalities.
Time and local government fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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while Svaleryd finds that more left-wing votes implies more weight on childcare over
education. Could our differing results on female politician effects have something to
do with this? It could be that in Sweden, female politicians and the left-wing parties
agree more on the desired level of spending on kindergartens than do their Norwegian
counterparts.
The estimated effects of left-wing and right-wing majority on table 5 are mostly
insignificant and also small in magnitude, something which is in line with the claim
by Martinussen (2004) that the majority did not decide much on its own in the local
government system up until 1992. They do however yield some (but weak) evidence
that increased right-wing influence implies more spending on education at the expense
of childcare, which is in accordance with the literature mentioned above. The estimated
effects of party fragmentation are highly unstable across specifications. (Note that the
effects here are the effects of less fragmentation, since the Herfindahl index take lower
values the more fragmented the council is.)
There is some evidence that more newly elected representatives lead to more spend-
ing on education. Although this does not need to be the case, this could reflect different
preferences among these politicians due to lower age. It is therefore reassuring that
the estimated effect of women in the council on kindergarten expenditures is so little
affected by the inclusion of this control variable.
Concerning the demographical control variables, we see from tables 3 and 4 that all
estimated coefficients have signs which comply well with our intuition. An increase in
the population share of one of the age groups children aged 0-6 years, children aged
7-15 years and elderly aged 65 or higher has a significant and positive effect on the
welfare service which is targeted at that group: childcare, education and elderly care,
respectively. The same holds for the results from the specification using relative shares.
These estimated effects are much larger in magnitude than the impact of women in
the local council: According to table 3, a one standard deviation (2.2 percentage points)
increase in the share of children aged 7-15 years in the population gives a 2.4 percentage
point increase in the budget share spent on schooling. That the demographical effects
are large makes sense because they represent not only ideological differences but also
actual needs for specific public services. If there is a baby boom, local politicians
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cannot ignore the impact of this on the demand for child care (and later education)
services.31 Through central government regulation, they are also required to offer a
certain level of these services.
The estimated effects of the share of women in the population are not statistically
significant in any of the specifications included. Population growth shows a relatively
large positive association with education spending and a is negatively associated with
spending on ’other purposes’ across all specifications. This could be interpreted as
population leading local politician to invest in schools even though school children’s
share of the population has not increased, because they expect the new inhabitants to
have children in school age soon. The small but significant negative effect of popula-
tion squared on education’s budget share could imply some economies of scale: If for
instance the number of pupils in each class is initially very low, population growth can
have cost-saving effects.
Income, at least the way it is measured here, seems to be of no importance. Divorce
risk shows some effects, indicating that more marriage disruptions lead to more spend-
ing on elderly care at the expense of other sectors. An explanation somewhat in line
with what Edlund and Pande (2002) postulate could be that women who are divorced
expect to be more dependent on public elderly care when they grow older, and therefore
favour higher spending in this sector. For the share of unmarried women, I got positive
estimated effects on spending on childcare and health care and social services (H/S)
and a negative for elderly care. The two former effects make sense if for instance some
of the unmarried women are single moms with low income, demanding both childcare
and social transfers.
Finally, as shown on table 4 the estimated effects of the female labour participation
rate are highly significant for most sectors. The estimated effect is as expected posi-
tive for the budget share spent on childcare and also for church and cultural services
and ’other’ purposes. For most other sectors it is negative. The estimated effects of
the populations’ education level in general shows very low t-values, but the effect on
31Note that these results say nothing about what happens to spending on kindergarten per child
or on elderly care per elderly inhabitant when the population shares change. For more on this, see
Borge and Rattsø (1995).
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childcare spending is positive and weakly significant. This seems reasonable or at least
not totally contrary to intuition. For instance, inhabitants with higher education could
have more positive attitudes towards public childcare.
To sum up, most of the estimated effects of the control variables are as expected
or make at least some sense. One should also note that in some cases, negative effects
in one sector might simply reflect ’crowding out’. Because the budget shares have to
sum to one, a positive effect on the spending in one sector inevitably implies negative
effects for one or several other sectors.
In general, the demographical and socio-economic variables show much larger effects
than the share women in the council and other variables related to the election result
do. This could reflect the large degree of consensus rule in Norwegian local politics.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
Are there other variables potentially related to the share of women in the council which
should have been included? As mentioned previously, the election data also contains
information of the gender of the mayor. If female representation in the council is
correlated with the occurrence of a woman in the mayor’s chair and the mayor has
considerable influence, the effects of women in the council could be partly picking up
what are in fact the effects of the mayor’s personal gender-related preferences. However,
estimating the standard model with a dummy for female mayor as an extra control
variable gives coefficients and significance levels for the influence of for Womansharest
which are to a very large degree the same as those in section 4.2. This indicates that
the gender of the mayor has little to do with gender representation in the council.
Moreover, as shown in the appendix, the effects of a female mayor seem to go in a
different direction, giving more weight on spending on elderly care (and less on other
health and social care). A main reason for why I do not focus more on this is that
according to (Gravdahl, 1998), it was common prior to 1992 that the mayor and the
deputy mayor swapped position in the middle of the election period, meaning that in
many (probably most) cases where the election data says that the mayor was female,
the mayor would be a man during the last two years of the period. And even to the
extent that these estimates do pick up an effect of gender, I believe that the empirical
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problems related to investigating these effects are more severe than they are for female
council representatives. The gender of the mayor candidates is very likely to be known
before the election, and hence the election of a female mayor could be picking up effects
of voter preferences to a larger extent than the female share of the council does.
If, on the other hand, the ’mayor effects’ do reflect differences in the politicians’
personal preferences, this indicates that female mayors differ from male mayors in
another way than do female councilmen from male councilmen. It could for example
be that in some municipalities, in order for a women to be elected mayor she must be
considered a ’moderate’ candidate.
Another concern could be that my political control variables fail to capture some
relevant aspects of the electoral outcome. Although the left-right cleavage as argued
above seems to be the most central distinction in Norwegian politics, there might be
other important party differences. For instance, Sørensen (1995) finds that politicians
from the Socialist Left Party have an even stronger preference for public child care
than Labour party representatives. The representatives from the right-wing Progress
Party also seems to differ from the rest of the right-wing politicians.32
As shown in the appendix, including the vote shares of six parties in addition to the
left-wing share of votes changes very the results little. The effect of female politicians
decreases from 0.007 to 0.006 compared to the result in table 3. There is also some
evidence that more support for the Socialist Left Party is related to higher spending
on childcare than left-wing support in general, which is not surprising. The Progress
Party is omitted because it did not exist during the first election period, but I also
did a check with this party’s votes included and got virtually the same results as those
shown in table 14.33
I also estimated the standard model with the unemployment rate as an extra con-
trol variable (results not shown), something which left the effects of female council
32Sorensen uses representatives from the centrist parties as a reference group, and fins no significant
evidence that representatives from the Conservative party differ in their preferences from this group.
The Progress Party representatives on the other hand prefer less spending on child care and culture
and more on education and elderly care than do centrist representatives.
33I did however get highly significant estimated effects of Progress Party support on the spending
on education (positive) and culture (negative).
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representation completely unchanged. This is good, because including this variable in
the other specifications would be a bit problematic since the unemployment rate is also
an economic outcome of local politics (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008).
Next I consider reasons for leaving some observations out. Firstly, some municipalities
had their borders changed during the period 1972-1999. If this only affected spend-
ing through changing population, this would already be accounted for. However, it
is also likely to influence some other local characteristics of the municipality, making
it perhaps inaccurate to consider them as being the same units (with the same fixed
effects) as before.34 Hence a natural robustness check is to estimate the standard model
excluding these municipalities for the whole period.
Other municipalities merged or split up and hence ceased to exist in the same form
as before. Others exist for the whole period but have missing values for some variables.
Restricting the data to a balanced panel is quite standard in panel data studies, so
as the next robustness check I ran a regression on the standard model excluding all
municipalities which have missing values for some included variable some year.
Another concern is errors in the data. In some (not many) municipalities, spending
on kindergartens falls dramatically one year and then returns to about its old level
the next. If spending on childcare is substantial, this should normally not occur. I
therefore estimate (3) excluding municipalities for those years when their spending on
child care dropped by more than 90 percent compared to the year before. Of course
some of these could be municipalities where the level was very low initially, but it
is hard to know where to draw the line and it is not a matter of many observations
anyway.
This last specification yields much the same same estimated coefficients as seen
on table 3, but with slightly higher t-values for the effects on childcare and admin-
istration expenditures. Excluding municipalities which change borders slightly alters
magnitudes and t-values of the βi’s for elderly care, health and social services and cul-
ture but leaves the estimated childcare effect unchanged. The results of the balanced
panel regression (table 16) are a bit more different. The estimated coefficient for the
effect of women in the local council on childcare spending is lowered to 0.005, and is
34Observations for the years in which the border change actually took place are already excluded.
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no longer statistically different from zero with a 10 percent level of significance. The
positive estimated effect on culture expenditures is also rendered insignificant, while
the negative estimated effect on spending on elderly care actually becomes significant.
Note however that imposing a balanced panel restriction alters some characteristics
of the data sample. When municipalities merge or split up it is likely to have something
to do with public spending. More specifically, they often merge in order to save costs in
some sectors. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the results are not completely different
from those of the unbalanced regression. Although the estimated child care effect is no
longer statistically significant, it is in the same order of magnitude as before and ’close
to’ significant.
Finally, I regressed the standard model excluding those municipalities with less
than 2500 inhabitants. A motivation for doing this is that when spending is measured
in budget shares, year-to-year changes appear bigger in those municipalities where the
total budget is small. In addition, small municipalities might have somewhat peculiar
spending patterns, and we do not want these to be driving the results.
As shown on table 18 in the appendix, this actually gives an effect of female repre-
sentation on the budget share devoted to childcare which is higher (0.011) than when
all municipalities are studied. It is also slightly more significant, perhaps reflecting that
the small municipalities have peculiar spending patterns causing some ’noise’ in the
data. The negative effect on administration also increases somewhat both in magnitude
and t-value, and the culture effect is still significant at a 10 percent level.
5 Discussion
Several of the explanations given in the previous section concerning the estimated
effects of the control variables are quite ad-hoc and perhaps even speculative. It is
also likely that some of them are just reflecting the effects of some other unobserved
variable to which they are related. However, the fact that most variables (especially
the demographical ones) seem to have sensible effects strengthens my overall faith in
the analysis. But more importantly, the main motivation for including the controls
variables was not to study their effects, but to help answer the main question of this
35
thesis: Is there an effect of politician’s gender on policy outcomes?
The reason to include the controls is (1) they are potentially important factors
determining the composition of local public spending and (2) that they might be cor-
related with the occurrence of women as council representatives. Although there are
not always obvious reasons for why (2) should be the case, we want to make sure that
we do not leave out something which could be the driving factor behind the results.
It turns out, however, that the control variables affect the estimated effects of
Womansharest on the budget priorities very little. The estimated effects of the ’naive’
regression without controls shown on table 1 actually persist to a large extent through
tables 2 and 3. (A notable exception is the effect on education expenditures, for which
R-squared also increases substantially when controls are included.) The results of the
regressions with more control variables are a bit more different, but this seems to be
more due to the exclusion of the earlier years of the period than a feature of the controls
themselves.35
When arguing for the importance of exogenous or quasi-random variation in politi-
cians’ identities, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Rehavi (2007) point at the
difficulty of separating between the effects of the politicians’ personal preferences and
the preferences of the voters who elect them. In my analysis, I have controlled for a
number of factors which do not state voters’ preferences explicitly but which are likely
to be correlated with them. When this does not affect my estimated βˆi’s, this could
imply that that nomination and election of female politicians is related to some other
unobserved voter preferences which show very little correlation with the control vari-
ables. But is that likely? Or is it more probable that the factors behindWomansharest
are not so much linked to voter preferences at all, but perhaps to processes within the
party system?
A rationale for why endogeneity in candidate’s identities should be at least of smaller
concern in the Scandinavian type of representative democracy is as Svaleryd (2009)
points out that voters vote for parties and that each party has several candidates.
However, if party lists differ a lot in how their degree of gender mix, voters who have
35When estimating the standard model using data from the periods 1980-1999 and 1986-1999 with-
out adding the new controls, I get an estimated childcare effect of 0.008 instead of 0.007 for 1980-1999
but otherwise very similar results.
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strong preferences for male or female candidates could use their votes to influence the
gender composition in the council.
Moreover, in Norway voters also are allowed to cast extra votes for individual
candidates. These rules have changed several times, and in some elections voters have
also had the opportunity to remove names from the voting bills and to insert names from
other party lists. These personal votes could be expected to have an effect on female
representation (Hellevik and Bjørklund, 1995), and possibly also to be correlated with
voter preferences for spending. Unfortunately, the election statistics do not contain
information on which or how many candidates receive ’extra votes’, only the number
of corrected voting bills.36
But again, if voter’s gender preferences had an effect, we would expect to see the co-
efficients change somewhat when including preference-related control variables. Altonji
et al. (2005) demonstrate a formal method for using the effects of the observed control
variables to measure how large the omitted variable bias due to unobserved factors is
likely to be. They examine whether the better results of pupils in catholic schools in
the US are due to selection bias and argue that since the effects of the included observ-
ables are small, it is unlikely that this could explain the whole effect. The authors give
a word of caution against misuse of this idea, especially ”if the observables are small in
number and explanatory power, or if they are unlikely to be representative of the full
range of factors that determine an outcome” (Altonji et al., 2005, p182). However, I
would argue that a similar (informal) line of reasoning can be made in support of my
results: If unobserved variables lie behind the estimated effects of women in the local
council, these have to be almost totally unrelated to the observables included.
Another concern than omitted variables is simultaneity. In its purest form, this
means that the causality between the regressor and the regressand could potentially go
both ways. I have already mentioned that there could be such links between spending
priorities and migration of different groups, something which determines the demo-
36Using micro-level data from the 2007 election, Christensen et al. (2008) finds no significant effect
and Christensen et al. (2003) only a very small effect of gender on the personal votes a candidate re-
ceives. This is however after controlling for other explanatory variables including party size, placement
on the election list, former representation and age. Since I do not control for other characteristics of
the representatives, the effects of extra votes could potentially be more severe.
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graphical variables. Reverse causality between childcare spending and female labour
participation is also possible. The main point here is not in which order events occur in
real-time: A spending decision could have been announced in advance and there could
also be forward-looking behaviour by both politicians and inhabitants. Simultaneity
bias in one estimator might cause also other coefficients to be biased if the regressors
in question are correlated. Then it is again reassuring that those effects which I have
found to be significant change so little when these controls are included.
Considering the political control variables, it is a bit harder to see how the links of
causality should be described. In the setup of section 2.2, election results depend on
voter preferences and the ’rules of the game’. Changes in the latter can be thought of as
exogenous. Changes in the former could be endogenous to current policy as described
above, but this can only affect future election results and not the one currently in
effect. If on the other hand there is some commitment to policy platforms (as in the
median voter model), then political parties can attract more voters by promising to
spend money on some specific purpose, thereby affecting both the election result and
the policy outcome. In that case, the election result and the spending variables for the
same period are determined simultaneously. The latter also concerns the number of
women elected.
Since the control variables as mentioned seem to have little influence on the esti-
mated β’s, the main concern is endogeneity in the variableWomanshare itself. Though
this endogenetity could be argued to be of several types, I find it easiest to grasp when





= γis + ξit + βiwomansharest + λiControlsst + κiUnobsst + ²ist (4)
where Controlsst as before is a vector of observed control variables, and Unobsst is
some unobserved variable of voter preferences. Let us for now assume that the control
variables are exogenous. The OLS assumption is
E(²st|Womansharest, Obsst, Unobsst) = 0
and in addition, cov(Womansharest, Unobsst) 6= 0, that is, the share of women in the
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council is related to the unobserved voter preferences. Since we cannot observe Qst, in




= γis + ξit + βiwomansharest + λiControlsst + uist (5)
This implies E(uist|Womansharest) 6= 0 in general. If the observed variables are
also correlated with the unobserved one we also have E(uist|Obsst) 6= 0. The OLS
assumption is violated, and the FE estimator will hence be biased. In which direction
depends on the direction of correlation and the parameters. If the unobserved prefer-
ences are positively correlated with Womansharest and κ > 0, βˆi is likely to overstate
the true effect.
6 Isolating exogenous variation
One strategy for dealing with endogeneity which has increased in popularity in recent
years is the so-called ’regressions-discontinuity’ approach. This utilizes the fact that
in close election races, which party or candidate wins can be considered as random.
Studies in which this is done include the one by Lee et al. (2004) as well as those by
Ferreira and Gyourko (2009), Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) and Rehavi (2007).
For my study of female council representatives this cannot be done or at least it
would be extremely time-consuming. If we knew the gender of the candidates who
received just enough or almost enough votes to receive a seat in the council, this could
in principle be utilized in a similar fashion. However, the electoral data does include the
number of female candidates on the party lists for most elections, but no information
on their placement on the lists. Moreover, there is no data on the personal votes cast
for each candidate, which are likely to be important in some cases.
Another solution would be to use one or more instrumental variables (IVs) for
female representation. Considering the model in equation 5, if we have a variable
Instrst which is (1) uncorrelated with the political outcome and (2) a determinant of
Womansharest, we can use this to solve the endogeneity problem. This is done by
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two-stage least squares (2SLS). First we regress
Womansharest = ωs+ µt + φInstrst + θControlsst + ηst (6)
under the standard assumption E(ηst|Instrst, Controlsst) = 0. Then, using the pre-




= γis + ξit + βi ˆWomansharest + δControlsst + uist (7)
Crucial for this to work is that cov(Instrst, uist)∀s, t, which requires that the instru-
mental variable is uncorrelated with the omitted variable. Additionally, we require
that all of the variables included in Controlsst are also uncorrelated with the error
term uist. If some of them were not, we would have to instrument those as well. The
condition for identification (Stock and Watson, 2007, p432) states that we need at least
as many excluded instruments as we have endogenous regressors. If we have one, the
coefficients are exactly identified. If we have more, they are over-identfied.
In an earlier version of her article, Svaleryd (2007) uses as an instrument changes
in the number of council seats, which is found to be significant but weak. It is also
uncertain whether the exclusion restriction is justified: A change in the number of seats
could very well affect the policy outcome.
Table 6: Gender quotation rules in Norwegian political parties
Party Liberals Socialists Labour Centre Christian
(V) (SV) (DNA) (Sp) (KrF)
Introduced 1974 1975 1983 1989 1993
Affected election 1975 1975 1983 1991 1995
Aff. election period 2 2 4 6 7
Instead I utilize internal party rules for gender representation. Five of the bigger
Norwegian parties introduced gender quotation in their party organizations during my
period of study: The Liberal Party (V) in 1974, the Socialist Left Party (SV) in 1975,
the Labour Party (DNA) in 1983, the Center Party (Sp) in 1989 and the Christian
Democratic Party (KrF) in 1993 (Christensen, 1999).
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Figure 3: The average share of women among the representatives of each party and in
















1948 1956 1964 1972 1980 1988 1996 2004
Year
DNA SV Sp
V KrF Whole council
(The average shares are calculated for the municipalities which existed at the beginning of each election
period. Note that the female shares are unweighted means of the the shares in each municipalities,
not the fraction women among all local council representatives in Norway.)
The average share women among the local council representatives of each of these
parties since 1975 is shown on figure 3, together with the average share women in local
councils as a whole. At a first glimpse, the picture is not very promising: The main
increases in female representation, both within parties and in total, did not occur in
the elections following the introduction of rules for gender representation in 1975, 1983
and 1991.37 Instead we see big jumps in the elections in 1979 and 1987, when no parties
introduced such rules. In 1991 we see a drop in the female share of representatives in
all parties except for the Socialist Left Party.38 However, this drop looks slightly lower
37The picture does not show whether the Liberal Party and the Socialist Left Party increased their
female shares in 1975, since there is no data on the gender composition for each party prior to 1975.
38According to Raaum (1995), the same thing happened in the Swedish parliamentary election and
led to a discussion in both countries about whether things were starting to go the wrong way. As she
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for the Centre Party. Concerning 1983, the increase in the share women among the
representatives of the Labour Party is also a bit above the overall increase, but not
much.
Another noteworthy story shown on this figure is that at least on average, very little
happened concerning female representation prior to the 1967 election. This coincides
with historical facts about the rise of female issues on the political arena. Although this
does not show in the aggregate figures, the number of municipalities with no women
in the local council at all did however decrease during the 50s and early 60s (Raaum,
1995).
Of course, a lot of other things than quotation rules in the parties affected female
political representation during this period. In 1971, women’s liberation activists en-
couraged voters to systematically use the system of personal votes to give women extra
votes, something which led to a large increase (Hellevik and Bjørklund, 1995) in the
share of women in many municipality councils in this election. In 1993, the new Local
Government Act came into force, requiring at least 40 percent of each sex in munic-
ipal standing committees and the executive board, but not in the council as a whole
(Guldvik, 2008).
Now take a look at figure 4. This uses the the data from the period 1947-1967 to
classify the municipalities into four groups, based on how low their share of women
in the local council was on average during this period. The line starting out lowest
represents those municipalities having two percent women or less on average. The
municipalities within each group are likely to share several other characteristics, but I
will not go through these here. What is striking is that convergence is far from perfect.
After the 1979 election the difference between the top and the bottom group was 10
percentage points. After the last election used in my dataset, 1995, it was still 7.5
percentage points.
The overall pattern is otherwise similar to that in the previous figure, but with some
exceptions: In the 1983 election and (less clearly) the 1975 election, the increases in
the female share were on average larger among the two groups of municipalities which
points out however, it could be that the ’extreme’ event was the big increase in the 1987 election, and
that the 1991 election is ’on trend’.
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1948 1956 1964 1972 1980 1988 1996 2004
Year
77−92% men 92−96 men
96−98% men 98−100% men
(The average shares are calculated for the municipalities which existed at the beginning of each election
period and which also existed during the whole period 1947-1963.)
historically had the lowest shares of women in their councils. The question is: Is this
due to these municipalities simply catching up with the rest, or is there an effect here
going through national parties requiring their local organizations to nominate more
women as candidates?
To investigate this, I consider changes in female representation in stead of the
absolute values. This is because a low share of women in the council originally is likely
to lead to larger increases in this share, but obviously not to a larger number of women
overall. Hence, the data is total differentiated. In addition, since the impact of an
increase in the number of female politicians is likely not to be in full effect in the first
year of the election period, I replace all variables by their means across each election
period (e.g. 1984-1987).39 Then I do the total differentiation. This yields data on
39Observations for which a variable does not exist during the whole election period are dropped.
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differentiated form for the election periods 2-7 (1976-1999).
The idea is that the increase in female representation should be higher in a munic-
ipality where there are few women in the council initially, and where the party which
implements gender representation rules has a large share of the council seats. The in-
struments are hence constructed as consisting of three components: A dummy Quotpt
for whether gender quotation was implemented in party p prior to the election period
t in question, historical strength HistSupportps of this party in municipality s and
local female under-representation historically, HistMachos. Using historical data for
party strength is not optimal since the local popularity of each party might change
substantially over time. However, using current or lagged values is highly problematic
since these are likely to influence spending directly.
I use historical data from the period 1947-1967. One problem about this is that
the data from this period does to a very little extent distinguish between municipal-
ities which merged with other municipalities and those which remained the same. In
both cases, they are likely to appear as having existed for the whole period, mean-
ing that they kept the same municipality identifier codes (’kommunenummer’). It is
possible to restrict the sample to those municipalities whose borders did not change
at all during the period, but this leaves very few observations. I therefore include all
municipalities whose codes were the same during the period 1947-1973. This should
not be too problematic since many of the mergers were between one large and one
small municipality40
When testing the validity of instruments, we need to control for other related fac-
tors: (1) There could be an extra ’catch-up effect’ in the election (e.g. 1975 or 1983)
when gender representation rules are introduced which is independent of party struc-
ture. (2) There could be an effect through local party strength in the same election
which is independent of previous female under-representation. (3) There could be
higher increases in Womansharest every year in municipalities which have few women
in the council but where the party in question has a strong position. (4) There could
be such a catch-up effect every year in those municipalities with low female represen-
40Eri (2004) has made a complete lists of Norwegian municipalities merging and altering their
borders.
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tation originally. (5) There could be different time trends for female representation in
municipalities depending on historical party structure. A priori, I would expect (1)
and (4) to be of most importance.
Without other control variables, the first stage regression equation when using only
one of the instruments is then
∆Womansharest = ωt + λInstrpst + γ1X1pst + γ2X2pst + γ3X3ps
+γ4HistMachos + γ5HistSupportps + ηst
(8)
with the assumptions
(I)E(ηst|ωt, Instrpst, X1pst, X2pst, X3ps, HistMachos, HistSupportps) = 0
(II)E(ηstηru) =
σ
2 for s = r and t = u,
= 0 otherwise
p denotes party. The Liberal Party and the Socialist Left Party are considered as
one block because their introduction of gender representation requirements affected
the same election. Moreover, X1pst = ∆Quotpt · HistMachos, X2pst = ∆Quotpt ·
HistSupportps and X3ps = HistMachos ·HistSupportps. γ1-γ5 then capture the effects
(1)-(5) above. Note that t now denotes election period and not year. ωt is a time fixed
effect. (Municipality fixed effect are not included in (8) since they are constant over
time.)
To proxy for local party strength, I use each parties’ average share of votes in the
elections from 1951 up until 1967.41 Of course, this proxy should work better early in
the period studied. It is also likely that the control variables have a bit different effects
in the 90s, when the growth in female representation had flattened out, than earlier
in the period. Nevertheless, to get a starting point I do the regression for the same
period of time, 1976-1999, for all instruments.
41I include the votes for the Norwegian Communist Party (NKP) in the V/SV share because SV did
not exist during the whole period and because many members of NKP joined SV later. Observing the
correlation between the historical and current vote share in the 1975 election, this seems to provide a
better proxy for party strength than just using the votes for SV.
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To construct the proxy HistMachos I used the period 1947-1967. The fact that
the numbers for of female council representatives changed relatively little during this
period indicates that these could reflect something structural. In principle, I could
have used the average share men in the council during this period. This is however
problematic because most municipalities had very few women in the council back then.
Whether the average share was 3 or 4 percent might say very little about how big the
under-representation was likely to be later on, at the time when the parties introduced
their new gender rules.
Or perhaps more importantly: Two municipalities which both elected no women in,
say, three of the elections might differ a lot in how reluctant the local political climate
actually was towards female politicians. One of the two might have been much further
from electing women in these elections than the other. The measure is ’censored’
because it is not allowed to take a higher value than 100.42 Furthermore, linearity
could be inappropriate because the difference between zero and five percent women
reflects a more dramatic increase than going from 20 to 25 percent.
Instead, a number of non-linear specifications can be considered. The proxy used
here is a dummy variable taking the value one if during the whole period, the mu-
nicipality always had less than 1/13 women in the council. (170 of 429 municipalities
shared this feature.) The value 1/13 is chosen because 13 is a common (and since 1955
the lowest possible) number of council seats.
The results of the first-stage regression are shown on table 7. We see that the V/SV
instrument has the ’wrong’ sign. According to these results, the jump seen on figure 4
for the two less female-promoting groups of municipalities seem to be a general effect
and not an effect going through parties. The instruments using gender requirement
rules in the Centre Party and the Christian Democratic Party also has very low t-values
The instrument for the Labour Party performs much better, showing a highly sig-
nificant positive effect in municipalities with few female politicians which increases in
local strength of the party. Moreover, we see that when this effect is accounted for, the
42Levitt (1996) discusses censoring for a totally different measure, namely the ADA ideological
scores for votes in the senate. There, the value 100 is the maximum score for how liberal a senator
can vote.
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Table 7: 1st stage regression for Womanshare
Party (1) (2) (3) (4)
SV/V DNA Sp KrF
Instr -0.155 0.311∗∗∗ 0.068 0.159
(-1.25) (4.62) (0.69) (0.89)
X1 0.019 -0.099∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.024
(1.10) (-3.52) (-0.63) (-1.44)
X2 0.058 -0.130∗∗∗ -0.062 0.064
(0.73) (-2.87) (-0.98) (0.48)
X3 0.029 -0.042 -0.015 0.005
(0.56) (-1.52) (-0.38) (0.07)
HistSupport -0.023 0.015 0.010 -0.043
(-0.69) (0.82) (0.40) (-0.81)
HistMacho -0.001 0.015 0.005 0.005
(-0.15) (1.30) (0.74) (0.69)
Observations 2267 2267 2267 2267
R2 0.115 0.124 0.115 0.116
t statistics in parentheses
time fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
estimated general 1983 effect for such municipalities (γˆ1) is in fact negative.
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is also the estimated 1983 effect of being a municipality where the Labour Party holds
a strong position (γˆ2), something which corresponds to the story from figure 3.
Is this estimated coefficient showing the effect of gender quotation, or is it just
coincidental? The fact that all the other effects (1)-(5) described above are controlled
for implies that there should be something real here: Municipalities in which the Labour
party had a strong position and where women traditionally were underrepresented
experienced larger increases in the shares of women in their local councils than did
other municipalities. A similar effect is also found with other specification with different
proxies, although not as highly significant as the one shown on table 7.
A way of further testing the validity is to see if there is a similar effect if we run the
regression ’assuming’ that the introduction of the quotation rules in the Labour Party
was in 1980 or 1988 instead (’placebo effect’). Doing this rendered negative estimated
43The reason why it appears otherwise on figure 4 could be that the Labour Party accounted for a
large share of the council seats in many of the municipalities.
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effects in both cases.
That the V/SV-instrument is working so bad even though this is one for which
the historical proxies should be relatively accurate, implies that it is little to do about
this. For the Sp- and KrF-instruments, using newer historical data is an option. Using
proxies based on the 1971 and 1975 elections for party support, I still get no signifi-
cant effect of the Sp-instrument. For the one using gender quotation in the Christian
Democratic Party I on the other hand get a t-value of 2.36, but I am a bit insecure
about whether this really reflect the impact of quotation. Other types of specification
(e.g. linear) using newer proxies also for Histmachos do not render similar results.
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I therefore stick to the instrument shown in column (2) of table 7. After all, it
is not surprising that this instrument performs the best: The Labour Party is by far
the largest of the parties mentioned here. The new gender rules were also introduced
in the middle of the period when the number of female politicians increased the most
(1968-1991), so the effects of the controls for overall trends X3ps, HistMachos and
HistSupportps might behave more nicely in this case. The big drawback from having
only this instrument is of course that there is only one period (1984-1987) which is
affected.
Table 8 shows the second-stage results of a two stage least squares (2SLS) regression
including demographical variables. Note that the control variables from the first stage
are included because they are not excluded instruments. It could be that for instance
traditional female-underrepresentation or party support has something to say for the
evolvement of public childcare spending. The other control variables employed in
sector 4 are not included, because they could have at least some correlation with the
unobserved variable. Table 20 in the appendix show the results of a 2SLS regression
with the standard controls, yielding much the same results.
The results are not directly comparable to those in section 4, since the model is now
on differentiated form with election periods as time units. On table 19 in the appendix
I show the estimates of a differentiated model without instruments. The estimated
coefficients are then similar to those in section 4 but slightly lower in magnitude, and
44In addition, I find a similar but somewhat less significant effect if I ’assume’ that it was the Centre
Party which introduced quotation this year.
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Table 8: 2SLS regression using gender representation rules in the Labour Party as
instrument for changes in the share women in the council (1976-1999)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
∆Womanshare 0.019 0.168∗ -0.077 0.016 0.014 -0.047 0.030 -0.124
(0.87) (1.78) (-0.75) (0.16) (0.31) (-1.02) (0.54) (-1.05)
X1[DNA] 0.001 -0.006 0.001 0.004 0.005∗ 0.004 -0.001 -0.007
(0.92) (-1.20) (0.22) (0.69) (1.94) (1.41) (-0.45) (-1.05)
X2[DNA] -0.002 -0.001 0.019 -0.026∗ 0.015∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.000 0.015
(-0.65) (-0.09) (1.18) (-1.66) (2.09) (-2.52) (-0.05) (0.80)
X3[DNA] 0.000 -0.011 0.012 0.008 0.001 -0.004 -0.008 0.002
(0.06) (-0.98) (1.01) (0.67) (0.11) (-0.70) (-1.20) (0.14)
HistSupport[DNA] -0.001 0.016∗ -0.014∗ 0.004 -0.005 0.008∗∗ 0.004 -0.012
(-0.30) (1.94) (-1.68) (0.47) (-1.33) (2.00) (0.89) (-1.15)
HistMacho -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.007
(-0.61) (-0.57) (-0.51) (-0.85) (-0.41) (0.43) (1.32) (1.09)
Observations 2267 2267 2267 2267 2267 2267 2267 2267
R2 0.252 0.096 0.266 0.246 0.090 0.017 0.008 0.070
t statistics in parentheses
time fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
only the childcare effect is significant.45
The IV-results are very uninformative, with very high standard errors for those
coefficients in which we are interested. This is not surprising, since the instrument
only gives us variation in ∆Womansharest for one period and the effect in this period
is also not very strong. The sad fact is that it implies that the results of the IV
regression cannot be used to say anything about the validity of the FE regression
results of section 4. While a 95 percent confidence interval for the childcare effect in
shown on table 3 says that the effect is likely to be somewhere between 0.0017 and
0.012646, the IV estimate in column 1 of table 8 gives the interval [-0.0233,0.0604]. On
the basis of this, one can neither reject the previous result nor claim that they now
45It is possible to do the IV estimation for undifferentiated yearly data like in section 4, simply by
letting the instrument be equal to HistMachos ∗HistSupportDNA,s for all years after 1983 and zero
for the other years, and controlling for HistSupportDNA,s after 1983. However, I am not sure how to
handle the standard errors in this case.
46The differentiated model shown in the appendix yields the interval [0.0003,0.0081].
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have additional support. The same holds for the weakly significant effects on cultural
and administrative spending found earlier.
There is one curiosity: Column 2 indicates that there could be a relatively large
positive effect on spending on education, something for which there is no proof in
section 4. Both OLS and 2SLS give confidence intervals containing zero, but the 2SLS-
estimate is to a much larger extent located around a positive effect. This persists
also when I only regress on election period 4 (1984-1987), although the t-statistic is
somewhat lower in this case. (Table 21 in the appendix.)
To sum up, I have found an instrument which is correlated with female political rep-
resentation. This seems not to be coincidental but a feature of what it utilizes, namely
the gender representation rules introduced in the Labour party in 1983. However, as
the only instrumental variable this is to weak to get anything out of the second-stage
estimates.
Why do the other instruments not work better? Several explanations are possible.
Firstly, some of the parties mentioned could be to small to have much of an impact. Ad-
ditionally, the support for the Liberal Party decreased substantially after the party was
split in 1972, something which could have led to fewer female representatives because
this party traditionally had relatively many female politicians. Another explanation
could be lack of party discipline.
Also, Hellevik and Bjørklund (1995) argues that as a reaction to an election where
the number of women elected increased a lot (1971, 1979, 1987), voters could be giving
men more personal votes in the following election.47 Unfortunately, patterns of personal
votes cannot be used in the instrumenting process because they are linked to voter
preferences. (Additionally, the data on this is scarce).
Yet another explanation is that the problem of censoring in measures applies to the
proxies for party support as well. This is actually not unlikely, since the four smaller
parties received no votes at all in many municipality elections during the early post-war
period. Constructing more appropriate measures for this would however require quite
some time spent on trial and failure.
47In addition, a new law was introduced prior to the 1975 election restricting the possibilities for
giving personal votes, but according to Hellevik the change was minor.
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7 Summary and conclusion
In this thesis I have discussed the mechanisms through which more women in polit-
ical positions might lead to other policy outcomes. I have emphasized the difference
between an indirect effect going through voter preferences and a direct (or ’partisan’)
effect of the preferences of the female politicians themselves.
Models in political economics differ in their predictions on whether there will be
such a direct effect. In the traditional median voter model, candidates’ policy platforms
converge to the platform preferred by the median voter, and their individual preferences
hence play no role. Citizen candidate models, on the other hand, can be used to show
that personal preferences can matter. I have presented a simple model belonging to this
class where I assume that access to political positions differs between men and women.
As I have demonstrated, such a model could explain why a decrease in this imbalance
between men and women will affect which policies are eventually implemented.
A typical example of a factor changing this imbalance is activism among women in
the political parties leading to promotion of more female candidates, something which
Norway and many other countries have experienced during the last four decades. I
therefore argue that the rapid increase in female representation in Norwegian politics
since the 1960s can be thought of as the result of exactly such ’structural changes’.
Data from this period should hence be suitable for analyzing whether there is in fact a
direct effect of female politicians on policy outcomes. This however requires that one is
able to separate this effect from other mechanisms working through voter preferences.
Running fixed effects-regression on Norwegian municipal spending data, I find a
small but highly significant positive effect of women in the local councils on the bud-
get share allocated to childcare spending. This effect persists and hardly changes in
magnitude when I include in the regression a rich set of variables to control for voter
preferences and other factor possibly related to the election of female politicians. It
is also highly robust to other changes in the model specification. In addition, I find a
significant positive effect on spending on church and cultural services in the same order
of magnitude which is also relatively robust and some evidence that female politicians
spend less on central administration.
These results are evidence in support of the claim that the personal preferences of
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politicians can matter for politics, although the effects found here are very modest.
Reasons for the latter could be that Norwegian local politics have traditionally been
relatively consensus-based and that the level of spending is determined by the grants
from the central government.
The fact that the results are so insensitive to the set of control variables included
could imply that omitted variables is not a big problem, but we cannot be certain of
this. Estimating the effect using instrumental variables would help us to check this
if the instrument explains enough of the variation in the share of women in the local
council.
I find that the gender quotation rules implemented in the Labour Party in 1983 had
a highly significant estimated effect on female council representation in those munici-
palities where the Labour Party had a strong position and where women traditionally
were highly under-represented. I do to a small extent find similar effects for the other
parties which introduced such rules.
Utilizing the Labour Party instrument in an instrumental variable regression, I find
that this instrument alone is to weak to give results saying anything about the validity
of the results of the standard fixed effects regression. With additional information and
more accurate specifications, it could be possible to get something more out of this
approach.
Due to the weak instrument, the results from the regression without use of instru-
ments stand as the final results. As mentioned, I find it unlikely that these do not at
least to some extent reflect a causal effect. That there is a positive effect on childcare
spending is also in accordance with other studies. Concerning the positive effect on
cultural expenditures (and the negative on administrative spending), there is to my
knowledge no literature saying whether this is reasonable or not.
As gender has been a popular subject in political economics through the recent year,
we are likely to see more interesting empirics on this in the year to come. More survey
studies on the preferences of male and female politicians in Norway or comparable
countries would be welcome in this context. There is also scope for more research on
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All variables used in this thesis is constructed using data from the municipality data-
base at the Norwegian Social Science Data Service (NSD).48 A detailed description
of most variables will be available at ESOPs webpage (http://www.esop.uio.no/
research/datasets/).
Table 9: Descriptive statistics, spending variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Exp. share childcare (CC) 0.031 0.027 0 0.175 12304
Exp. share education (ED) 0.264 0.072 0.061 0.672 12304
Exp. share eld. care (EC) 0.155 0.092 0 0.552 12304
Exp. share health/social 0.109 0.056 0.009 0.475 12304
Exp. share church/culture 0.05 0.028 0.009 0.397 12304
Exp. share transport 0.04 0.03 0 0.43 12304
Exp. share central adm. 0.069 0.031 0.016 0.457 12304
Exp. share ’other’ 0.281 0.102 0.078 0.814 12304
Total spending (NOK 1000) 233313.781 768456.012 7549.02 22902210 12304
TotexpCC/TotexpEC 0.244 0.302 0 7.689 12347
TotexpCC/TotexpED 0.136 0.126 0 1.265 12365
TotexpED/TotexpEC 3.732 14.902 0.203 934 12353
48except from the dummies for gender representation rules, if one considers those as ’data’ as well.
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics, electoral variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Womanshare 0.23 0.109 0 0.649 12336
Voteshare left 0.409 0.156 0 0.844 12336
Leftwing maj. 0.323 0.468 0 1 12336
Rightwing maj. 0.552 0.497 0 1 12336
Fragmentation 0.302 0.099 0.145 1 12336
Newreps 0.634 0.101 0.111 1 8834
Female mayor 0.062 0.241 0 1 12336
HistMacho 1.958 0.803 1 3 11450
HistSupport V/SV 0.117 0.085 0 0.493 11644
HistSupport DNA 0.396 0.158 0 0.72 11644
HistSupport Sp 0.123 0.116 0 0.537 11644
HistSupport KrF 0.07 0.061 0 0.296 11644
Table 11: Descriptive statistics, demographical and socio-economic variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Population 0.88 2.082 0.021 47.556 12389
Pop. squared 5.109 70.416 0 2261.602 12389
Age 0-6 0.097 0.018 0.052 0.194 12389
Age 7-15 0.136 0.022 0.067 0.211 12389
Age 66+ 0.155 0.041 0.046 0.325 12389
Women in pop. 0.494 0.012 0.413 0.552 12389
Mean income (NOK 10000) 12.012 3.71 1.063 23.843 9259
Divorce risk 0.056 0.04 0 0.227 11950
Unmarried wom. 0.179 0.05 0.054 0.452 11950
Women working 0.564 0.067 0.348 0.799 6128
Higher ed. 0.097 0.036 0.032 0.323 6580
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8.2 Additional control variables
This specification includes more control variables than in the standard model, but less
than in the model shown on table 4.
Table 12: The effect of female representation on shares of total spending (1980-1999)
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
Womanshare 0.007∗∗ -0.015 -0.009 0.015 0.007 -0.007 -0.011∗ 0.013
(1.98) (-1.39) (-0.69) (1.16) (1.25) (-1.39) (-1.81) (0.72)
Newreps -0.001 0.014∗ -0.012 0.012 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.013
(-0.48) (1.84) (-1.11) (1.12) (0.36) (0.53) (-0.62) (-0.93)
Voteshare left 0.015∗∗ -0.035∗∗ 0.036 -0.036 0.012 -0.014 0.004 0.018
(2.45) (-1.98) (1.48) (-1.63) (1.39) (-1.65) (0.42) (0.51)
Fragmentation 0.006 -0.021 -0.031 -0.013 0.015 0.007 -0.014 0.051
(0.84) (-1.13) (-1.18) (-0.48) (1.52) (0.56) (-1.05) (1.41)
Population -0.002 0.156∗∗∗ 0.007 0.017 -0.008 0.004 0.020∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
(-0.42) (6.80) (0.45) (1.11) (-1.01) (0.71) (3.43) (-5.31)
Pop. squared 0.000 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.52) (-4.72) (1.31) (-0.18) (0.43) (-1.37) (-2.64) (3.01)
Age 0-6 0.251∗∗∗ 0.205 -0.236 0.085 -0.035 -0.112 -0.044 -0.114
(6.44) (1.45) (-1.34) (0.48) (-0.43) (-1.65) (-0.56) (-0.43)
Age 7-15 0.047 0.973∗∗∗ -0.244 -0.072 0.040 -0.207∗∗∗ 0.047 -0.584∗∗
(1.14) (7.76) (-1.52) (-0.47) (0.47) (-3.64) (0.70) (-2.37)
Age 66+ 0.022 -0.086 0.561∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗ -0.039 0.140∗∗ 0.059 -0.262
(0.65) (-0.76) (3.55) (-3.08) (-0.64) (2.23) (1.08) (-1.31)
Women in pop. -0.122∗ -0.277 -0.026 0.142 0.064 0.038 0.044 0.136
(-1.80) (-1.44) (-0.09) (0.57) (0.67) (0.30) (0.35) (0.41)
Mean income 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001∗∗ -0.000 0.001
(0.16) (-1.41) (0.02) (-0.66) (1.01) (2.30) (-0.16) (0.37)
Divorce risk -0.080∗∗∗ 0.085 0.449∗∗∗ 0.105 -0.145∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.036 -0.384∗∗
(-2.76) (0.88) (3.54) (0.84) (-3.18) (0.12) (-0.67) (-2.24)
Unmarried wom. 0.087∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.332∗∗∗ 0.087 0.008 -0.054 0.037 0.078
(3.77) (1.15) (-2.97) (0.91) (0.21) (-1.27) (0.94) (0.59)
Observations 8734 8734 8734 8734 8734 8734 8734 8734
R2 0.721 0.405 0.665 0.234 0.035 0.153 0.046 0.463
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on municipalities.
Time and local government fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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8.3 Robustness checks for section 3
The tables shown here give results for slight alterations of the standard model for which
results are shown on table 3. All employ data from the whole period 1972-1999. Tables
13 and 14 are specification with more control variables, while the last four employ the
same controls as in 2 but with some observations excluded.
Table 13: Robustness check: Controlling for the gender of the mayor
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
Womanshare 0.007∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.018 0.018 0.010∗∗ 0.000 -0.010∗ 0.001
(2.61) (-0.86) (-1.60) (1.64) (1.99) (0.00) (-1.68) (0.06)
Female mayor -0.001 -0.002 0.006 -0.006∗ -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.006
(-0.50) (-0.54) (1.40) (-1.70) (-0.76) (-1.11) (0.54) (1.04)
Voteshare left 0.013∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ -0.004 0.000 -0.020∗∗ 0.000 0.049∗∗
(3.49) (-5.30) (2.77) (-0.24) (0.06) (-2.20) (0.03) (2.04)
Fragmentation -0.000 0.042∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.034∗∗∗ 0.003 0.002 -0.008 0.014
(-0.03) (3.66) (-1.33) (-2.87) (0.54) (0.20) (-1.01) (0.73)
Population 0.010∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ -0.012 0.003 -0.006 0.002 -0.002 -0.128∗∗∗
(2.65) (7.87) (-1.32) (0.36) (-1.30) (0.35) (-0.52) (-7.18)
Pop. squared -0.000∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(-2.46) (-3.56) (1.62) (-0.05) (1.37) (0.03) (2.12) (3.58)
Age 0-6 0.053∗∗ 0.028 -0.055 0.051 -0.027 -0.037 0.035 -0.048
(2.09) (0.25) (-0.52) (0.47) (-0.73) (-0.69) (0.61) (-0.30)
Age 7-15 -0.078∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗ -0.112 -0.109 0.008 -0.108∗ 0.025 -0.698∗∗∗
(-2.90) (10.16) (-1.08) (-1.13) (0.13) (-1.84) (0.50) (-3.97)
Age 66+ 0.019 -0.054 0.469∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗ -0.078∗ 0.029 0.019 -0.196
(0.74) (-0.54) (4.28) (-2.37) (-1.87) (0.52) (0.45) (-1.32)
Women in pop. -0.026 -0.235 -0.307 0.019 -0.007 0.087 0.126 0.343
(-0.47) (-1.21) (-1.35) (0.11) (-0.09) (0.77) (1.33) (1.21)
Observations 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251
R2 0.803 0.406 0.689 0.231 0.106 0.187 0.137 0.528
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on municipalities.
time and local government fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 14: Robustness check: Controlling for support for each party
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
Womanshare 0.006∗∗ -0.007 -0.016 0.017 0.010∗∗ 0.000 -0.010∗ 0.000
(2.18) (-0.71) (-1.49) (1.49) (1.98) (0.06) (-1.70) (0.02)
Voteshare left 0.021∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ 0.070∗ 0.033 -0.014 -0.032∗ -0.002 0.075∗
(2.64) (-4.21) (1.74) (0.89) (-0.87) (-1.70) (-0.20) (1.78)
Fragmentation 0.003 0.027∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.028∗ 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.025
(0.73) (1.93) (-2.03) (-1.75) (0.97) (0.24) (0.08) (1.15)
Voteshare SV 0.018∗ 0.055 -0.048 -0.022 -0.002 0.012 -0.005 -0.009
(1.95) (1.38) (-1.17) (-0.55) (-0.12) (0.59) (-0.35) (-0.17)
Voteshare DNA -0.012 0.071∗ -0.017 -0.044 0.017 0.013 0.002 -0.030
(-1.42) (1.90) (-0.39) (-1.24) (1.03) (0.69) (0.19) (-0.67)
Voteshare V 0.006 -0.025 -0.016 -0.005 -0.007 0.000 0.001 0.046
(0.93) (-0.98) (-0.63) (-0.17) (-0.82) (0.02) (0.05) (1.48)
Voteshare Sp 0.008∗∗ -0.018 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.006 0.006 0.008
(2.21) (-1.18) (-0.25) (-0.06) (1.03) (-0.65) (0.79) (0.40)
Voteshare KrF -0.011 -0.020 -0.036 0.003 0.013 0.013 0.034∗∗ 0.004
(-1.43) (-0.63) (-1.04) (0.08) (1.16) (0.86) (2.07) (0.09)
Voteshare H 0.006 -0.013 -0.047∗∗ 0.034 0.010 -0.003 0.003 0.011
(1.09) (-0.68) (-2.17) (1.59) (1.00) (-0.35) (0.31) (0.40)
Population 0.012∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ -0.016∗ 0.004 -0.005 0.001 -0.001 -0.125∗∗∗
(2.85) (7.77) (-1.68) (0.50) (-1.10) (0.27) (-0.22) (-7.02)
Pop. squared -0.000∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(-2.61) (-3.61) (1.77) (-0.09) (1.24) (0.05) (1.86) (3.59)
Age 0-6 0.062∗∗ 0.024 -0.072 0.065 -0.029 -0.035 0.033 -0.047
(2.46) (0.21) (-0.68) (0.60) (-0.78) (-0.65) (0.58) (-0.30)
Age 7-15 -0.073∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ -0.111 -0.107 0.001 -0.106∗ 0.021 -0.706∗∗∗
(-2.73) (10.13) (-1.07) (-1.12) (0.02) (-1.77) (0.42) (-4.02)
Age 66+ 0.019 -0.051 0.457∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗ -0.078∗ 0.031 0.017 -0.204
(0.75) (-0.51) (4.13) (-2.11) (-1.86) (0.56) (0.42) (-1.38)
Women in pop. -0.039 -0.226 -0.303 0.005 0.001 0.090 0.136 0.336
(-0.71) (-1.16) (-1.34) (0.03) (0.01) (0.78) (1.44) (1.20)
Observations 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251 12251
R2 0.805 0.408 0.689 0.232 0.108 0.187 0.138 0.528
SV = Socialist Left Party, DNA = Labour Party, V = Liberal Party, Sp = Centre Party,
KrF = Christian Democratic Party, H = Conservative Party
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on municipalities.
Time and local government fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 15: Robustness check: Excluding municipalities whose borders have changed
during 1972-1999
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
Womanshare 0.007∗∗ -0.010 -0.015 0.016 0.008∗ 0.001 -0.009 0.002
(2.54) (-0.99) (-1.35) (1.41) (1.69) (0.23) (-1.54) (0.10)
Voteshare left 0.013∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.000 -0.019∗∗ 0.001 0.053∗∗
(3.32) (-5.52) (2.87) (-0.36) (-0.03) (-2.02) (0.15) (2.13)
Fragmentation -0.000 0.040∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.036∗∗∗ 0.003 0.002 -0.007 0.016
(-0.03) (3.42) (-1.37) (-2.93) (0.62) (0.31) (-0.88) (0.84)
Population 0.011∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ -0.009 0.002 -0.006 0.003 -0.001 -0.131∗∗∗
(2.65) (7.77) (-1.01) (0.31) (-1.25) (0.54) (-0.39) (-7.16)
Pop. squared -0.000∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(-2.50) (-3.52) (1.46) (0.00) (1.34) (-0.05) (1.94) (3.54)
Age 0-6 0.055∗∗ 0.003 -0.096 0.087 -0.018 -0.025 0.049 -0.054
(2.09) (0.02) (-0.89) (0.80) (-0.46) (-0.46) (0.82) (-0.33)
Age 7-15 -0.078∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗ -0.058 -0.134 -0.002 -0.108∗ 0.026 -0.734∗∗∗
(-2.77) (10.11) (-0.54) (-1.35) (-0.03) (-1.77) (0.51) (-4.00)
Age 66+ 0.014 -0.044 0.466∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗ -0.074∗ 0.049 0.023 -0.233
(0.53) (-0.42) (4.13) (-2.25) (-1.70) (0.85) (0.55) (-1.52)
Women in pop. -0.032 -0.279 -0.325 0.034 -0.014 0.073 0.144 0.399
(-0.55) (-1.41) (-1.39) (0.20) (-0.17) (0.62) (1.46) (1.35)
Observations 11656 11656 11656 11656 11656 11656 11656 11656
R2 0.806 0.406 0.688 0.230 0.105 0.190 0.137 0.531
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on municipalities.
Time and local government fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 16: Balanced panel regression (1972-1999)
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
Womanshare 0.005 0.001 -0.022∗ 0.015 0.005 0.001 -0.011∗ 0.006
(1.53) (0.10) (-1.69) (1.19) (0.90) (0.14) (-1.71) (0.33)
Voteshare left 0.014∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ -0.017 -0.002 -0.019∗ 0.000 0.076∗∗∗
(3.37) (-6.20) (2.55) (-1.07) (-0.32) (-1.84) (0.02) (3.51)
Fragmentation -0.001 0.031∗∗ -0.012 -0.036∗∗∗ 0.000 0.003 -0.009 0.024
(-0.36) (2.58) (-0.81) (-2.68) (0.10) (0.36) (-1.05) (1.25)
Population 0.013∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.010 -0.003 0.011∗ -0.006 -0.144∗∗∗
(2.09) (7.40) (-2.04) (-1.03) (-0.42) (1.91) (-1.13) (-5.74)
Pop. squared -0.000 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.002∗∗
(-1.10) (-5.21) (3.70) (2.41) (-0.34) (-1.55) (1.09) (2.52)
Age 0-6 0.072∗∗ 0.046 -0.176 0.103 -0.037 -0.068 0.039 0.021
(2.37) (0.37) (-1.40) (0.79) (-0.88) (-1.13) (0.62) (0.12)
Age 7-15 -0.082∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗ -0.118 -0.185 -0.037 -0.129∗ -0.023 -0.527∗∗∗
(-2.62) (9.91) (-0.98) (-1.61) (-0.81) (-1.90) (-0.46) (-3.39)
Age 66+ 0.015 -0.025 0.365∗∗∗ -0.191∗ -0.078∗∗ 0.078 -0.026 -0.137
(0.50) (-0.22) (2.93) (-1.79) (-2.08) (1.17) (-0.60) (-0.90)
Women in pop. -0.042 -0.232 -0.394 -0.048 0.002 0.146 0.160 0.409
(-0.64) (-1.00) (-1.59) (-0.26) (0.02) (1.04) (1.34) (1.19)
Observations 9044 9044 9044 9044 9044 9044 9044 9044
R2 0.816 0.427 0.693 0.212 0.111 0.196 0.146 0.536
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on municipalities.
time and local government fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 17: Robustness check: Excluding observations with more than a 90 percent drop
in childcare spending
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
Womanshare 0.007∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.017 0.018 0.009∗ -0.001 -0.010∗ 0.003
(2.70) (-0.94) (-1.53) (1.65) (1.86) (-0.14) (-1.77) (0.18)
Voteshare left 0.013∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ -0.003 0.001 -0.020∗∗ 0.001 0.048∗∗
(3.40) (-5.22) (2.77) (-0.24) (0.10) (-2.21) (0.10) (1.98)
Fragmentation -0.001 0.042∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.034∗∗∗ 0.003 0.002 -0.008 0.015
(-0.20) (3.57) (-1.38) (-2.81) (0.66) (0.22) (-1.10) (0.81)
Population 0.010∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ -0.013 0.003 -0.006 0.002 -0.001 -0.129∗∗∗
(2.47) (7.72) (-1.33) (0.45) (-1.31) (0.43) (-0.35) (-7.06)
Pop. squared -0.000∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(-1.79) (-3.36) (1.56) (-0.05) (1.29) (-0.17) (1.77) (3.39)
Age 0-6 0.060∗∗ 0.037 -0.073 0.051 -0.028 -0.037 0.035 -0.047
(2.35) (0.32) (-0.67) (0.48) (-0.75) (-0.68) (0.61) (-0.29)
Age 7-15 -0.077∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ -0.125 -0.110 0.012 -0.106∗ 0.038 -0.704∗∗∗
(-2.86) (10.15) (-1.21) (-1.16) (0.19) (-1.79) (0.80) (-3.97)
Age 66+ 0.019 -0.047 0.466∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗ -0.079∗ 0.031 0.023 -0.210
(0.73) (-0.47) (4.21) (-2.33) (-1.85) (0.55) (0.55) (-1.40)
Women in pop. -0.030 -0.243 -0.302 0.022 -0.015 0.089 0.140 0.339
(-0.53) (-1.24) (-1.32) (0.13) (-0.18) (0.78) (1.49) (1.19)
Observations 12141 12141 12141 12141 12141 12141 12141 12141
R2 0.805 0.407 0.690 0.230 0.106 0.187 0.139 0.528
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on municipalities.
time and local government fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 18: Robustness check: Excluding municipalities with less than 2500 inhabitants
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
Womanshare 0.011∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.015 0.013 0.012∗ 0.003 -0.014∗∗ 0.004
(3.48) (-1.08) (-1.25) (1.16) (1.88) (0.55) (-2.49) (0.22)
Voteshare left 0.008 -0.097∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.003 -0.020∗∗ -0.001 0.050∗
(1.55) (-4.96) (2.88) (-0.08) (-0.37) (-2.47) (-0.18) (1.84)
Fragmentation 0.002 0.048∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.019
(0.57) (3.28) (-2.43) (-2.78) (0.70) (0.49) (0.13) (0.88)
Population 0.012∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 -0.095∗∗∗
(3.04) (7.11) (-2.78) (0.71) (-0.98) (-1.28) (0.24) (-5.90)
Pop. squared -0.000∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗∗
(-2.65) (-3.17) (2.09) (-0.49) (1.29) (1.00) (1.28) (2.74)
Age 0-6 0.015 0.258∗ 0.200 0.004 -0.029 -0.084 0.005 -0.370∗∗
(0.44) (1.80) (1.55) (0.03) (-0.58) (-1.57) (0.10) (-2.09)
Age 7-15 -0.133∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.091 0.026 -0.030 -0.166∗∗∗ 0.017 -0.709∗∗∗
(-3.92) (7.12) (0.73) (0.19) (-0.57) (-3.41) (0.35) (-4.01)
Age 66+ -0.009 0.125 0.489∗∗∗ 0.056 -0.099∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ 0.023 -0.445∗∗∗
(-0.25) (1.06) (4.08) (0.58) (-2.06) (-3.07) (0.49) (-2.60)
Women in pop. -0.042 -0.015 -0.523∗ 0.016 -0.020 -0.048 -0.039 0.670∗
(-0.59) (-0.05) (-1.86) (0.07) (-0.20) (-0.46) (-0.35) (1.69)
Observations 9079 9079 9079 9079 9079 9079 9079 9079
R2 0.825 0.380 0.754 0.288 0.133 0.258 0.157 0.601
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on municipalities.
Time and local government fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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8.4 IV-estimation
Table 19 shows the results of an OLS estimation with differentiated data, analogous
to the one on table 3. The variables differentiated are the unweighted means for each
election period. Finally, table 20 shows the 2SLS estimates when control variables are
included. Results from a 2SLS regression only including election period 4 are shown
on table 21. Note that the interaction terms X1DNAst, X2DNAst and X3DNAst are not
included in that specification because when the dummy Quott is equal to one these are
the same as HistMachos, Histsupports and InstrDNAst, respectively.
Table 19: Standard model, differentiated using election periods as time units
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
∆Womanshare 0.004∗∗ 0.004 -0.013 0.015 0.006 -0.004 -0.008 -0.005
(2.09) (0.54) (-1.33) (1.64) (1.33) (-0.88) (-1.51) (-0.46)
∆Voteshare Left 0.005 -0.021∗ 0.039∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.004 -0.010 0.000 -0.004
(1.62) (-1.67) (2.60) (-0.39) (-0.66) (-1.42) (0.06) (-0.23)
∆Fragmentation 0.001 0.027∗∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.007 0.012∗∗ -0.008 0.029∗∗
(0.35) (2.58) (-2.20) (-2.08) (-1.31) (2.09) (-1.17) (2.01)
∆Population 0.013∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ -0.026 0.009 0.010 0.002 -0.004 -0.139∗∗∗
(2.81) (7.54) (-1.22) (0.40) (1.03) (0.17) (-0.33) (-5.64)
∆Pop. squared -0.000∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗
(-2.04) (-4.52) (1.09) (-0.24) (-0.16) (0.80) (0.55) (2.41)
∆Age 0-6 0.069∗∗ 0.049 -0.064 0.144 -0.164∗∗∗ 0.032 -0.052 -0.015
(2.49) (0.45) (-0.49) (1.12) (-2.83) (0.54) (-0.71) (-0.10)
∆Age 7-15 -0.007 0.920∗∗∗ -0.035 -0.131 -0.082 -0.142∗∗∗ 0.022 -0.545∗∗∗
(-0.27) (9.14) (-0.29) (-1.11) (-1.54) (-2.60) (0.33) (-3.97)
∆Elderly -0.004 -0.158 0.486∗∗∗ -0.176 -0.156∗∗∗ 0.018 0.063 -0.073
(-0.15) (-1.48) (3.81) (-1.40) (-2.76) (0.31) (0.89) (-0.50)
∆Women in pop. 0.044 0.204 -0.169 -0.037 -0.028 -0.102 0.252∗∗ -0.164
(0.91) (1.06) (-0.73) (-0.16) (-0.28) (-0.98) (1.99) (-0.62)
Observations 2429 2429 2429 2429 2429 2429 2429 2429
R2 0.281 0.282 0.279 0.252 0.091 0.062 0.032 0.124
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
time fixed effects included but not reported
Variables for which there are one or more missing observations during an election period are not
included for that period.
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Table 20: 2SLS regression (1976-1999) with additional control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
∆Womanshare 0.017 0.159∗ -0.070 0.013 0.015 -0.046 0.032 -0.119
(0.78) (1.73) (-0.69) (0.13) (0.32) (-0.98) (0.57) (-1.01)
∆Voteshare Left 0.004 -0.029∗ 0.031 0.000 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 0.005
(0.90) (-1.66) (1.57) (0.01) (-0.62) (-0.19) (-0.27) (0.21)
∆Fragmentation 0.001 0.028∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.022∗ -0.005 0.014∗∗ -0.007 0.019
(0.42) (2.36) (-1.99) (-1.69) (-0.88) (2.21) (-0.98) (1.19)
∆Population 0.014∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ -0.037 0.006 0.014 0.001 -0.002 -0.138∗∗∗
(2.62) (6.34) (-1.49) (0.24) (1.26) (0.10) (-0.12) (-4.77)
∆Pop. squared -0.000∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗
(-2.10) (-3.83) (1.19) (-0.29) (-0.29) (1.06) (0.19) (2.17)
∆Age 0-6 0.062∗∗ 0.150 -0.067 0.073 -0.121∗ -0.024 -0.018 -0.055
(2.11) (1.19) (-0.48) (0.52) (-1.94) (-0.37) (-0.23) (-0.34)
∆Age 7-15 0.012 0.921∗∗∗ -0.077 -0.130 -0.087 -0.130∗∗ 0.019 -0.529∗∗∗
(0.44) (8.04) (-0.61) (-1.03) (-1.53) (-2.22) (0.26) (-3.57)
∆Elderly 0.006 -0.158 0.438∗∗∗ -0.166 -0.113∗ 0.016 0.081 -0.105
(0.22) (-1.29) (3.22) (-1.23) (-1.87) (0.26) (1.07) (-0.66)
∆Women in pop. -0.031 0.155 -0.285 -0.094 0.067 0.034 0.060 0.094
(-0.55) (0.65) (-1.07) (-0.36) (0.57) (0.28) (0.40) (0.31)
X1[DNA] 0.001 -0.007 0.001 0.004 0.005∗∗ 0.003 -0.001 -0.006
(0.86) (-1.49) (0.25) (0.81) (1.98) (1.32) (-0.44) (-0.97)
X2[DNA] -0.002 0.006 0.019 -0.025 0.014∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ 0.001 0.008
(-0.65) (0.44) (1.20) (-1.60) (2.01) (-2.82) (0.08) (0.42)
X3[DNA] 0.000 -0.006 0.010 0.008 0.001 -0.004 -0.008 -0.001
(0.13) (-0.58) (0.88) (0.67) (0.12) (-0.74) (-1.17) (-0.10)
HistSupport[DNA] -0.000 0.014∗ -0.014 0.005 -0.005 0.008∗ 0.003 -0.011
(-0.08) (1.75) (-1.59) (0.60) (-1.25) (1.92) (0.71) (-1.09)
HistMacho -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.005
(-0.42) (-0.31) (-0.55) (-0.85) (-0.32) (0.48) (1.26) (0.84)
Observations 2267 2267 2267 2267 2267 2267 2267 2267
R2 0.262 0.170 0.278 0.249 0.094 0.025 0.007 0.093
t statistics in parentheses
time fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 21: 2SLS regression (1984-1987) without additional control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Childc. Educ. Eld. C. H/S Culture Transp. Adm. Other
∆Womanshare 0.019 0.128 -0.032 0.046 0.016 -0.061 0.001 -0.117
(1.03) (1.51) (-0.41) (0.52) (0.30) (-1.15) (0.01) (-1.01)
HistSupport[DNA] -0.003 0.010 0.009 -0.018 0.010 -0.012∗ 0.000 0.004
(-1.06) (0.84) (0.90) (-1.55) (1.40) (-1.68) (0.05) (0.26)
HistMacho 0.000 -0.012∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 -0.000 0.000
(0.51) (-3.06) (0.65) (0.45) (1.60) (1.33) (-0.05) (0.07)
Observations 395 395 395 395 395 395 395 395
R2 . . . 0.020 0.015 . . .
t statistics in parentheses
time fixed effects included but not reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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